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Signature Identification in the Light of Science
and Experience
ROGER C. PARK*

INTRODUCTION

The Daubert case encourages judges to ask whether forensic
identification expertise is valid, not merely whether it is accepted among
practitioners.' The example of DNA has shown what real science can do,
and has highlighted the shortcomings of other forms of forensic science
The combined effect of Daubertand DNA has contributed to skepticism
about forensic identification techniques. This skepticism may lead to
exclusion of evidence or to procedural limits aimed at making the
expertise more trustworthy or preventing it from having undue weight. I
will discuss these two alternatives in the context of the specific forensic
problem of signature authentication expertise of forensic document
examiners (FDEs), after first considering general principles applicable to
experience-based expertise.

I.

EXPERIENCE-BASED EXPERTISE: GENERAL CONSIDERATION

Experience counts. It brought important advances long before
humans devised the alphabet, much less the scientific method.3 In writing
about Daubert, academic lawyers should be wary of making too broad a
* James Edgar Hervey Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings
College of the Law. I wish to thank David Faigman, Ed Imwinkelried, Michael Risinger, and Michael
Saks for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article, while exonerating them for any
responsibility for its contents. The source-finding work of Charles Marcus of the U.C. Hastings library
faculty was invaluable. Billy Minshall and Lila Mirrashidi of the U.C. Hastings Class of 2009
contributed able. research assistance, and Beverly Taylor has my thanks for her accurate and timely
administrative work.
I. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (I993). See also David L. Faigman, Is
Science Different for Lawyers?, 297 SCIENCE 339, 339-40 (2002); David L. Faigman, Making the Law

Safe for Science: A Proposed Rule for the Admission of Expret Testimony, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 401
(1996).
2. See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic
Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 893 (2005).

3. For interesting accounts of human progress in technology and agriculture in prehistoric times,
see JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES (2005), and NICHOLAS
WADE, BEFORE THE DAWN: RECOVERING THE LOST HISTORY OF OUR ANCESTORS (2o06).
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denunciation of experience-based expertise.' Unsystematic inductions
from experience are often useful, even in deciding how to use scientific
studies.' Of course, it is indisputable that experience can lead us astray,
and flaws in human reasoning distort our interpretation of it.
The question for judges who must screen expert testimony is not
whether experience is ever helpful. At heart, it is the familiar evidence
problem of assessing probative value against the counterweights of cost,
prejudice, and waste of time, while bearing in mind alternative forms of
proof. 6 The legal literature has provided some helpful guidelines.7

One important question is whether experts who offer experiencebased expertise are in a position to learn from their experience. Judge
McKenna's well-known example of experience-based expertise, the
testimony of a harbor pilot, presents us with a case where the answer
clearly seems to be "yes." 8 The harbor pilot learns from experience
whether his beliefs about how to bring a ship safely to its berth are valid.9
There is a "feedback loop" and a penalty for being wrong."° The pilot is
probably in a better position to learn from experience than the
documents examiner, because the documents examiner often does not
get accurate feedback about whether her experience-based inductions
were correct. The fact that a jury reached a verdict consistent with her

4. I am using the term "experience" because it is familiar. I intend to exclude expertise that is
based on personal experience, on the reported experience of others, and on introspection. Other terms
that might describe what I am talking about are "fireside inductions" or "unsystematic inductions."
5. Fireside inductions are needed when we make judgments about the internal and external
validity of experiments. For example, common-sense inductions tell us that handwriting experts might
try harder on proficiency tests than lay subjects, so that differences in performance could be due to
effort instead of expertise; and that studies showing superior expert performance on signature
authentication might not generalize to other tasks, such as attribution of authorship in cases of
disguised hand printing. D. Michael Risinger, Handwriting Identification, in 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY

379, § 33:14 (David L. Faigman et al. eds.,

2007-2008 ed.) [hereinafter MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE].
6. Cf.Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, I8o, 182-84 (1997) (describing an analogous
process under Rule 403 of weighing prejudice and other costs against probative value while
considering alternative means of proof).
7. See authorities cited infra notes 38-47.
8. See United States v. Starzecpyzel, 88o F. Supp. 1027, 1041, io46 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
9. This is a supposition on my part. It seems plausible that harbor pilots would get negative
feedback upon going aground or damaging the ship. For an example, see Henry K. Lee & Carl Nolte,
Cosco Busan Pilot Charged with Pairof Crimes, S.F. CHRONICLE, Mar. I8, 2008, at BI (reporting that
harbor pilot who crashed into Bay Bridge was indicted for misdemeanors based on negligent conduct,
including sailing in the fog, speeding, failing to check navigation equipment, and not using radar).
However, they may make other mistakes that go undetected or unpunished. For example, in the
absence of systematic record-keeping and controlled testing, experience-based experts can have
mistaken beliefs that go undetected because they take the form of unnecessary precautions. For
examples of unnecessary precautions, see Jack Foisie, U.S. Pilots Fly Modern Jets but Cling to
Superstitions, 3 0 W. FOLKLORE 140 (1971).
io. Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability: How the
Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 15, 56 (2003).
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conclusions does not tell her much."
In the absence of a feedback loop and penalty, it is reasonable for
courts to put the burden of doing research validating the expertise upon
its proponents, rather than upon the doubters. By doing so, courts would
merely be requiring that the expertise be tested. Sometimes experience
itself is enough of a test, and the expert can claim to have learned in the
"school of hard knocks." But if the expert has no trustworthy way of
determining whether he was wrong, there has been no test.
Handwriting identification doubters have been criticized for
mounting a basically negative attack, as opposed to providing their own
empirical studies showing that the expertise is untrustworthy.'2 But where
the expertise is not tested in ordinary practice because of the lack of a
feedback loop and penalty, it is reasonable to require that it be tested in
some other way.
One way of validating handwriting identification expertise would be
to test its premises scientifically, in which case the expertise would no
longer be experience-based in the sense I am using the term here.
Experience would have been used to generate hypotheses, but the
resulting conclusions would be based on scientific testing. Experiencebased expertise can also be tested by the "black box" method: instead of
testing underlying premises and cause-and-effect hypotheses, the
researcher tests the proficiency of the expert at doing what the expert
claims to be able to do. 3 A controlled experiment testing whether
forgeries have blunt endings more often than genuine signatures is an
example of the former approach, while a proficiency test that evaluates
i I. Id.; see also Randolph N. Jonakait, The Assessment of Expertise: Transcending Construction,
37 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 301,342-43 (I997).
12. Andre A. Moenssens, Meeting the Daubert Challenge to Handwriting Evidence: Preparing
for a DaubertHearing, http://forensic-evidence.com/site/ID/ID-FBI.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
When the subject of testing and validity comes up, it should also be pointed out that no
research has ever surfaced that denies the existence of the skill of competent handwriting
examiners or that proves that such skill does not exist! In other words, the only critical
publications are the Risinger-Denbeaux-Saks articles, which do not deny explicitly the
existence of the skill, but state only that they have not been convinced the skills exists. Their
disbelief does not constitute proof of the non-existence of the skill of handwriting
examiners. There are no studies showing that the skill of competent forensic document
examiners in identifying authors of handwritings does not exist. The critics have it
backwards.
Id.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See David Black et al., The Frequency of the Occurrence of HandwritingPerformanceFeatures
Used to Predict Whether QuestionedSignaturesAre Simulated, 15 J. FORENSIC DocuMEr EXAMINATION
17 (2003). The investigators had thirty-one participants create 620 simulated signatures. Id. These were
compared to 177 genuine signatures produced by one participant. Id. An FDE was asked to examine
the genuine and simulated signatures and count blunt endings. Id. at 22. The FDE found blunt endings
in 16.9% of the genuine signatures and 72.7% of the simulated signatures. Id. at 23 tbl. i. The value of
the study is diminished by the fact that a single subject created all of the genuine signatures; it is
possible that her genuine signature was unusually devoid of blunt endings.
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whether document examiners are more accurate than lay people in
detecting forgeries is an example of the latter approach." On the specific
task that is examined in this Article, signature authentication, there has
been a significant amount of proficiency testing, and this testing will be
discussed later in this Article.
Another question is whether experience-based testimony will be
prejudicial because jurors think it is scientific when it is not. If the
specialist clothes herself in the language of science when the testimony is
not really the product of the scientific method, it may be given too much
weight.'6 The expert who assumes the aura of science while really basing
her testimony on unsystematic inductions creates the worst of both
worlds, by appropriating the prestige of science without its
acknowledgment of uncertainty; delivering testimony that may be more
clear and definite (and hence convincing) than what a real scientist
would deliver. 7
When the expert witness relies upon unrecorded personal
experience, the testimony can also be prejudicial because the witness can
use the cloak of experience to conceal bias or ignorance. Personal
experience is, after all, personal. For example, an expert's claim that "I
have never seen a similar instance" may mean, "You don't know what I
have seen and what I haven't, so I can say this and get away with it.' I
Testimony that an opinion is based upon "my 26 years of experience in
the field" may mean, "It's really a surmise on my part. I believe it to be
true, but I can't really tell you why I think that. It's really more of an
impression that I have than anything else but I can't say that it's a
surmise or a vague impression, could IT"'

Because experts who rely upon personal experience have leeway in
tailoring their testimony, safeguards against bias are important. When
the crime lab is an arm of the prosecution and there is no attempt to wall
off the expert from extraneous information indicating that the defendant
15. Michael J. Saks, Forensic Identification:From a Faith-Based "Science" to a Scientific Science,
FORENSIC

SCL INT'L (forthcoming 2008).

16. See United States v. Starzecpyzel, 88o F. Supp. 1027, 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("With regard to
scientific experts, a major rationale for Frye, and now Daubert,is that scientific testimony may carry an
'aura of infallibility.' . . . Skilled experts generally present less of a problem, as, with all due respect,
accountants are unlikely bearers of an aura of infallibility." (citation omitted)).
17. See Jonakait, supra note I I, at 308 (citing Anthony Champagne et al., An Empirical
Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in American Courts, 31 JURIMETRICS J. 375, 38o (99)
(proposing that "jurors more willingly accept experts who present information nontechnically and give
firm conclusions than those who do not")).
18. For this "translation," see John 1. Thornton & Joseph L. Peterson, The General Assumptions
and Rationale of Forensic Identification, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 29:21. Cf.
Jonakait, supra note iI, at 310 & n.30 ("[T]he fact-finder need never take a scientific expert witness'
'word for it."' (quoting MICHAEL J. SAKS & RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN

5 (1983)) (alteration in original)).
19. Thornton & Peterson, supra note 18.

LITIGATION
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is guilty, the identification expert is especially susceptible to bias.2" For
example, in a terrorism case, the FBI fingerprint identification experts
who erroneously identified the fingerprints of an Oregon lawyer as
matching a latent print found on a bag of detonators in Madrid may have
been influenced by knowledge that the lawyer had converted to Islam
and had represented a Taliban sympathizer.' So the presence of
safeguards against bias is another factor the judge could take into
account in deciding whether to exclude or limit the testimony.
Another consideration is the distinction between descriptive expert
opinions and evaluative ones, a distinction that turns upon the degree of
inference and speculation involved in an experience-based opinion. It is
easy to make the case for using an experience-based expert for purposes
of educating the jury about occurrences and conditions observed by the
expert, such as practices within an industry. The "summarizational"
expert who, for example, testifies to trade practices differs from the lay
witness only in that he is allowed to be less concrete; to summarize
instead of telling a series of anecdotes." It is more difficult to justify
testimony by the experience-based "translational" or interpretive expert
(the expert who says what something means). 3 The translational witness
may be wrong in her inferences in ways that are misleading and hard to
penetrate; the process of getting from sense data to testimony is
complicated and extraordinary.
One can imagine handwriting expertise that is purely descriptive and
summarizational. This might include testimony about class
characteristics, such as styles taught in school, that unwary jurors might
mistake for individual characteristics. For example, when I was in grade
school, I was taught to make sevens with a hook. I do not remember
seeing a hookless, crossed seven until after I went to a different part of
the country to go to college. A jury that thinks a crossed seven is an
unusual quirk, like a heart used in place of a period, would obviously
profit from learning that many people write it that way. 24
20.

D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic

Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1,21 (2002).
21. Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Achilles' Heel of Fingerprints,WASH. POST, May 29, 2004, at A27;
see also Robert B. Stacey, Report on the ErroneousFingerprintIndividualization in the Madrid Train
Bombing Case, 7 FORENSIC SCI. COMM. (2005), http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/jan2oo 5 /special

report/2005.special-report.htm. Mr. Stacey, Unit Chief of the FBI Quality Assurance and Training
Unit, concluded that context effect influenced the initial identification (though he did not specifically
state that the examiners were aware of Mr. Mayfield's Muslim connections), and that subsequent
identifications were "tainted" because, among other things, the subsequent examiners were aware of
the previous examiner's conclusion and "[t]o disagree was not an expected response." Id.
22. D. Michael Risinger, Functional Taxonomy of Expertise, in
supra note 5, § 2:3.

23.

I MODERN SCIENTFIc EVIDENCE,

Id.

See generally Marvin L. Simner et al., A Comparison of the Arabic Numerals One Through
Nine, Written by Adults from Native English-Speaking vs. Non-Native English Speaking Countries, 15
24.
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To use an example from case law, consider the testimony of the
defense expert in the Fujii case.25 There, the prosecution offered the
testimony of a forensic document examiner who purported to be able to
tell that the hand printing on address labels on drug shipments was Mr.
Fujii's hand printing.26 This was an adventurous claim, for a number of
reasons, including poor performance of experts on proficiency tests
involving hand printing, 7 and the difficulty of assigning authorship to
intentionally disguised writing. 8 (The printer of the labels and, if guilty,
the defendant who is asked to supply exemplars both would have had
plenty of motivation to disguise their printing.) Moreover, Mr. Fujii's
hand printing may have been particularly nondistinctive. In conjunction
with the Daubert hearing on the admissibility of FDE testimony, the
defendant submitted an affidavit of Mark Litwicki, the Director of
Loyola University's English as a Second Language program.29 As
described by the court, at the Dauberthearing on the admissibility of the
expert testimony, the Court described the defendant's affidavit as
follows:
Mr. Litwicki avers that he has had extensive experience examining the
handwriting styles of foreign students, including Japanese students, as
he has taught many Japanese students in this country. He further avers
that he spent two years teaching English to Japanese students in Japan
and is "especially familiar with the manner in which Japanese-trained
writers make the characters of the English alphabet." Mr. Litwicki
avers that the Japanese language requires its students to spend a great

deal of time learning to write several thousand Japanese characters,
that uniformity of characters is "an important and valued principle of
Japanese handwriting," that Japanese students "spend many years
attempting to maximize the uniformity of their writing" and that
"Japanese-trained writers also tend to write English characters in a
very uniform manner." Mr. Litwicki concludes, "In my opinion, it
would be very difficult for an individual not familiar with the English
handwriting of Japanese writers to identify the subtle dissimilarities in
J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION I (2003) (offering an example of a study providing information
about this sort of class characteristic). The Simner et al. study found, among other things, that among
writers of Arabic numbers, 97% of the 113 German university students surveyed wrote crossed sevens
sometimes also adding a hook, whereas 98% of the 86 Japanese students surveyed wrote hooked
sevens without a cross. Id. at 14 tbl.7.
25. United States v. Fujii, 152 F. Supp. 2d 939,941-42 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
26. Id. at939-40.
27. Id. at 941 ("Michael Saks, who testified for the defense, testified that he was aware of only
one study of the reliability of handprinting identification, and in that study, only 13% of the
handwriting experts tested got the right answer; 45% identified the wrong person."); Risinger, supra
note 5, at 513 (describing the hand printing proficiency test). It seems to have been a particularly hard
test, in which a professional document examiner wrote a mock holdup note simulating the hand
printing of another subject, and 45% of the subjects assigned authorship to the forger instead of to the
actual author. See id.
28. Risinger, supra note 5,at 505 (citing ALBERT S. OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS 13-14
(19io) [hereinafter OSBORN, 1910 edition]).
29. Fujii, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 941.
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the handwriting of individual writers.,

30

Now, suppose that the Fujii case had gone to trial, without the FDE
expert. The address labels of disputed authorship are an exhibit, as are
the demand exemplars showing known examples of Mr. Fujii's hand
printing. The jury would be given the daunting task of making
comparisons. Surely the jury would be entitled to hear the testimony of
Mr. Litwicki about how Japanese writers of English make very uniform
characters. Except for its conclusion, the affidavit is descriptive and
summarizational.
I will put aside descriptive testimony like that of Mr. Litwicki for
purposes of this Article. The testimony I will be evaluating is testimony
similar to that contained in Appendices i and 2, where there is a good
measure of expert inference and interpretation as well as description.
Another consideration in evaluating experience-based expertise is
what, with some misgivings, I will call inherent plausibility. By this I
mean that the judge making the admissibility determination is entitled to
use her own experience, introspection and fireside inductions in deciding
whether the theories of the expert are persuasive. It is not plausible to
think that the gravitational attraction of the stars at the moment of birth
affects personality, when the gravitational attraction of the attending
physician would be greater; however, it is plausible to believe that
someone tracing someone else's signature might write more slowly than
someone writing her own signature. Inherent plausibility was an
important element in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,3 where it was hard
to believe that the expert could formulate his complicated, nuanced
criteria for detecting tire abuse with accuracy in the absence of any
empirical testing, or that he could be accurate in his complicated, hardto-disprove inferences about what would cause a worn tire to blow out,
while lacking the ability to make ball-park estimates about a simple fact
that could have been disproved had the expert been mistaken (the
number of miles of wear that the tire had endured).32 In assessing
inherent plausibility, the judge is entitled to consider not only whether
she herself finds the theory plausible, but whether other people she
respects finds it plausible-in other words, to use the authority of others
as one guide to decision.
Finally, the judge should consider the alternatives to using the
specific type of experience-based testimony. One form of considering the
alternatives is to consider alternatives that exist at the time of trial. For
example, testimony about the cause of an illness based on clinical
experience might be excluded if more trustworthy epidemiological
30. Id.
31. 526 U.S. 137, 141, 153, 157-58 (i999).
32.

See id. at 137.

HeinOnline -- 59 Hastings L.J. 1107 2007-2008

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:I1IOI

evidence is available.33 A more adventurous approach is to ask what
alternatives are conceivably possible-in other words, to be demanding
consumers and to take into consideration not only whether better
research is actually available, but whether the field would be encouraged
to do better research if judges excluded experience-based expertise.34
If this factor is taken into consideration, then forensic identification
may be a better target for a demanding consumer than experience-based
behavioral expertise, because true experiments are easier to conduct in
the former area. It is feasible to test propositions about handwriting with
randomized trials, but not propositions about coerced confessions or
rape trauma, because one cannot assign subjects to undergo coercive
treatment.35 These obstacles do not stand in the way of experiments
examining premises about handwriting, or the proficiency of handwriting
experts, though the fact that so far there is not much overlap with
established academic inquiry may be a formidable obstacle to finding
academic researchers who are motivated to do the studies.
One can argue for a generally permissive view toward forensic
identification testimony by pointing out that it is probably better than
eyewitness identification testimony, and that overly broad exclusion of
expert testimony could lead to too much reliance on dubious eyewitness
identification testimony. 6 But this argument can never be a justification
for admitting expert testimony that is affirmatively misleading, though
perhaps it might be an argument that marginally helpful expertise is
worth the time and money. But when the danger of being misled by
eyewitness testimony is important, a better remedy might be to allow
testimony by experts about flaws in eyewitness testimony, rather than
allowing dubious expertise about other forms of identification.37 At any
rate, trying to take the danger of prejudice from flawed eyewitness
testimony into account on a case-by-case basis would diminish the
33. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Should the Courts Incorporate a Best Evidence Rule into the
Standard Determining the Admissibility of Scientific Testimony?: Enough Is Enough Even When It Is
Not the Best, So CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19,33 (1999).

34. See David L. Faigman et al., How Good Is Good Enough?: Expert Evidence Under Daubert
and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645, 667 (2000); Imwinkelried, supra note 33, at 28.

35. Moreover, observational studies cannot necessarily fill the gap in the behavioral area, because
of problems with determining the ground truth. Rape trauma syndrome is an example. In determining
the effects of rape for purposes of distinguishing between rape victims and complainants making false
claims of rape, the best comparison would be between women who accurately claim to have been
raped and women who falsely claim to have been raped. This comparison is not feasible, so a
comparison of the symptoms of women who report being raped and those who report not being raped
is substituted for it.
36. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Flawed Expert Testimony: Striking the Right Balancein Admissibility
Standards, I8 CRIM. JUST. 28, 29 (2003).

37. For studies on helpfulness of expert testimony about eyewitnessing conditions, see BRIAN L.
D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW

CUTLER & STEVEN

19-54 (1995). See also Roger C. Park, Eyewitness Identification: Expert Witnesses Are Not the Only
Solution, 2 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 305, 306-07 (2003).
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precedential value of decisions about whether the expertise meets
standards of validity, make appellate review more difficult, and perhaps
lead the judge into subjective assessments of lay testimony that are best
left to the jury.
Another factor to be considered is whether the fact-finder will make
a comparison of the trace and the source in the absence of expert
testimony. For example, when the proffered testimony is bullet lead
analysis, there will be no such comparison if the expertise is excluded.
The information about the chemical composition of the bullets will
simply not come in, and no one will make a comparison between the
composition of the crime scene bullets and the composition of the bullets
found on the defendant. On the other hand, if FDE testimony is
excluded, the task of making the comparison between a questioned
document and known exemplars can still be done. The jury will do it
without the aid (or hindrance) of FDE testimony. Of course, it would be
possible to prevent such comparisons altogether, and Jennifer Mnookin
has called attention to early cases that did exclude comparison of
handwriting evidence,"' but this course seems unlikely in modern
practice. Exclusion might have unforeseen side effects (the jury might
wonder what was being concealed and hold it against one of the
parties).39 Moreover, the current Federal Rules of Evidence seem to
contemplate that the trier of fact will compare handwriting, though it is
not clear that they absolutely require it.a"
In place of exclusion, one can attempt to reduce the prejudicial
38. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of HandwritingIdentification Evidence
and the Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 1723, 1764-66 (2oo) (citing nineteenth
century cases excluding handwriting exemplars offered solely for the purpose of allowing the jury to
make comparisons of handwriting).
39. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 188 (1997) (citing Stephen A. Saltzburg, A
Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence,
66 CAL. L. REV. IOUI, 1019 (1978) ("If [jurors'] expectations are not satisfied, triers of fact may
penalize the party who disappoints them by drawing a negative inference against that party.")).
40. Federal Rule of Evidence 9o(b)(3 ) provides that authentication may be accomplished by
"[c]omparison by the trier of fact or by expert witnesses with specimens which have been
authenticated." The Advisory Committee Note expresses disapproval of "common law restrictions
upon the technique of proving or disproving the genuineness of a disputed specimen of handwriting
through comparison with a genuine specimen, by either the testimony of expert witnesses or direct
viewing by the triers themselves." FED. R. EViD. 9oi advisory committee's note. The restrictions
referred to were reservation to the judge of the question of genuineness of exemplars and "imposition
of an unusually high standard of persuasion." Id. Of course, the advisory committee note was not
enacted by Congress, and is merely a guide; moreover, its permissive attitude towards experts is
arguably obsolete in light of the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, codifying the Daubert
case. See United States v. Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097, ii0 (D. Alaska 2005). However, it would
seem odd to prevent comparisons by the trier of fact in view of this language and the provision in
Federal Rule of Evidence 9oi(b)(2) allowing nonexperts to compare handwriting and give opinions.
Federal Rule of Evidence 9oi(b)(2) specifically provides for authentication of handwriting by
"[nlonexpert opinion as to the genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for
purposes of the litigation."
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effect of exaggerated expertise with procedural devices. Examples
include instructions warning about the flaws of the expertise, restrictions
on expert use of scientific terms, and restrictions on testimony about
certain inferences-for example, allowing testimony only about
similarities between the trace and the exemplar, while prohibiting
testimony about the ultimate conclusion that they came from the same
source.4' Procedural devices can also be used in an attempt to combat
hidden bias, improve accuracy, or enhance the adversary system's ability
to reveal the defects of experience-based testimony. Examples include
requiring blind comparisons of the trace and exemplar,4"evidence "lineups,"43 and case-specific proficiency tests.
II.

THE PARTICULAR CASE OF SIGNATURE AUTHENTICATION

The seminal law review article on handwriting identification is
Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons
of Handwriting Identification "Expertise"(Exorcism article).' In a wellknown passage, the article states that "[a] rather generous reading of the
data would be that in 45% of the reports forensic document examiners
reached the correct finding, in 36% they erred partially or completely,
and in 19% they were unable to draw a conclusion."45 The authors add
that after excluding a test that was unreasonably easy, a less generous
conclusion would be that the examiners were correct 36% of the time,
erred partially or completely 42% of the time, and were unable to reach
a conclusion 22% of the time. 46
The Exorcism article was a helpful wake-up call, one that provided
plenty of ammunition for questioning claims of expertise that are either
global (FDEs can do everything from detecting forgery to telling who did
the forgery) or exaggerated (FDEs are error-free). Subsequent work by
handwriting identification skeptics has taken into account additional
data, including studies comparing expert-to-lay performance and
comparing expert-to-chance performance. 7 It has also provided a more
task-specific analysis of the expertise, distinguishing between different
skills, such as the skills of signature authentication, of attributing
authorship to disguised writing, and of attributing authorship to hand
41. See United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70-71 (D. Mass. 1999); United States v.
Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1030, 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

42. Risinger et al., supra note 20, at 45-47.
43. Id. at 47-50.
44. D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The

Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise," 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1989).
45. Id. at 747.

46. Id. at 748.
47. See Risinger, supra note 5,at 379; D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and
Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets HandwritingIdentification Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21, 4164 (1996).

HeinOnline -- 59 Hastings L.J. 1110 2007-2008

May 2008]

SIGNA TURE IDENTIFICA TION

IIII

printing. 4s
This Article will also attempt a task-specific analysis in conformity
with the mandate of the Kumho Tire case.49 The specific task that I will
evaluate is that of determining whether a questioned signature is
genuine. This task is treated as a distinct one by FDEs, which seems
plausible in view of the differences between signatures and other writing,
and between detecting simulation in signatures and the harder task of
assigning authorship to disguised or simulated writing." The skill could
be broken down into sub-skills, for example, the subtasks of detecting
forgery by skilled forgers versus naive forgers, or of detecting simulations
of complex versus simple signatures.'
However, too much
subcategorization would impede the development of precedent and
impose unrealistic demands on researchers.
By signature authentication, I am referring to the task of
determining whether a questioned signature is the genuine, naturallywritten signature of the person named in the signature. 2 A signature
might be inauthentic in a number of ways. A person might write
another's name as his "signature," without any attempt to imitate the
other person's handwriting, 3 or the inauthentic signature might be an
intentional imitation, either by tracing or by freehand imitation. Tracing
could be done in several ways-for example, by placing the laterquestioned document on top of the genuine signature with a light source
behind the genuine-signature model, or by using the genuine-signature
model to make indentations on a paper under the model and then inking
the indentations. There are more exotic possibilities, such as machinegenerated imitations and "guided hand" signatures produced by
someone aiding or controlling the hand of the person named in the
signature.
48. Risinger, supra note 5, at 379.
49. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (i99); Risinger, supra note 5, at 389.
5o. As Professor Risinger notes, standard FDE theory holds that it is much more difficult to
attribute authorship to a forgery than it is to determine that a signature is not genuine. Risinger, supra
note 5, at 394 n.13 (citing ALBERT S. OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS 286-87 (2d ed. 1929)
[hereinafter OSBORN, 1929 edition]); see also WILSON R. HARRISON, SUSPECT DOCUMENTS: THEIR

SCIENTIFIC EXAMINATION 374 (1966); Ordway Hilton, Can the Forger Be Identified from His
Handwriting?,43 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 547, 547, 548, 555 (1953); sources cited infra note 215.

5i. These are indeed just examples. Other conceivable subtasks would vary according to the
number of exemplars available, whether the exemplars were demand exemplars (written with
knowledge that they might be used for forensic identification) or course-of-business exemplars, or
whether the person named in the questioned signature was in a different physical condition (older,
sicker, in more pain) than when that person's exemplars were collected.
52. I say "named in the signature" despite the fact that some signatures are logos that cannot
really be said to contain discernible letters of a name. The reports on the studies that I will describe
give me no reason to think that logo signatures were predominant or even strongly represented in the
studies.
53. This might occur because he lacks a model or because he does not think the signature will
ever be questioned.
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The first problem for a commentator is to hit upon a handy way of
describing the different types of errors that can be made in signature
authentication. The use of the familiar terms "false negatives" and "false
positives," or "false hits" and "false alarms," would be technically
accurate (if terms are defined) but possibly confusing. The reason is that
some readers might intuitively regard a decision falsely saying that a
signature was genuine as a "false positive," while others would think of a
decision falsely saying that a signature was a forgery as a "false positive."
In cases in which the evidence is being used in a criminal prosecution, we
tend to think of a "false positive" as a decision that incorrectly identifies
an innocent person as a criminal, and a "false negative" as one that
incorrectly exonerates a guilty person. Using that convention, when the
crime charged is forgery, a decision that mistakenly identified the
signature as not being authentic would be a "false positive." But if
another type of crime were charged (say, drug dealing, when the issue is
whether a Western Union money order signed with the name of the
defendant was signed by the defendant), then a decision that falsely
identified the signature as being genuine would be a "false positive."
In an attempt at uniformity, I will use the following terminology to
describe errors in signature authentication. The error of saying that a
signature is genuine when it is not genuine will be described as "false
authentication." The error of saying that a signature is not genuine when
it is in fact genuine will be described as "false elimination." In making
the latter error, the subject decided that the person named in the
signature did not sign it (eliminated him), when in fact the person named
in the signature did in fact sign it. 4
First, I will examine two proficiency tests involving signature
authentication administered by Collaborative Testing Services (CTS)."
54. One could argue for different terminology. For example, Moshe Kam uses the terms "false
authentication" and "false simulation-detection" for the two types of error. Moshe Kam et al.,
Signature Authentication by ForensicDocument Examiners, 46 J.

FORENSIC

Scis. 884, 886 (2OOI). I have

opted for the term "false elimination" for two reasons. First, it is shorter. Second, the studies that I will
be describing (with a notable exception) do not specifically ask the subjects to distinguish between
genuine signatures and "simulated" signatures. See Jodi Sita et al., Forensic Handwriting Examiners'
Expertise for Signature Comparison, 47 J. FORENSIC ScIs. 1117, i118 (2002). Instead, they ask whether
the signature is genuine or not, or some very similar question. In addition, there is a difference
between the concepts of "false elimination" and "false simulation-detection." A signature might be
forged without simulation (the forger does not know what the genuine signature looks like, only the
name of the person he is seeking to stand for) or simulated without forgery (seeking deniability, the
person named in the signature makes an obvious tracing of his own signature, or creates a freehand
disguise of his handwriting while writing his own name-for example, a right-handed person writes his
name with his left hand, and tries to inject differences in letter slant and character formation).
55. See COLLABORATIVE TESTING SERVS., INC., CRIME LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING PROGRAM:
QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS ANALYSIS, REPORT No. 88-5 (1988) [hereinafter CTS REPORT No. 88-5] (on
file with author); COLLABORATIVE TESTING SERVS., INC., CRIME LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING
PROGRAM: QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS ANALYSIS, REPORT No. 85-8 (1985) [hereinafter CTS REPORT No.
85-8] (on file with author). CTS is a private company that tests the performance of forensic and
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These proficiency tests do not compare expert and lay performance, and
there are various differences between the test environment and actual
casework, 6 so they are of limited help in deciding whether experts will
help jurors. Nonetheless, extreme results on proficiency testing could say
something about the field. Were the experts to perform no better than
chance, then their testimony should be excluded. 7 If intuition and
introspection tell us that the task is easy and the experts surprise us with
their poor performance, that is also a reason to doubt that their
testimony would be helpful. Of course, experts might also surprise with a
flawless performance on a task that looks hard, in which case we should
be more receptive to what they have to say, though we would still have to
bear in mind that we are both using intuition and ignoring differences
between the test situation and actual casework. As in other decisions
about the generalizability of test results, there is a good deal of room for
subjective judgment.
A. THE 1985 CTS TEST
I will start with the 1985 CTS test?, It is worth some discussion
because, depending on how one views the results, it suggests a high error
rate. It is also one of the most famous proficiency tests, since it was
discussed in the original Exorcism article,59 in the Galbraiths' critique of
that article, 6° and in the Risinger response to that critique.6'
The test givers created twelve checks with signatures. (Apparently
all of the signatures were written as "Elizabeth J. Drinkwalter," though
the test materials are not totally explicit on this point.) 62 The same person
industrial labs. When the Forensic Science Foundation received grants from the U.S. Justice
Department in the 1970s to test the proficiency of crime labs, CTS became a subcontractor and
developed tests. See Thornton & Peterson, supra note 18, at 41 n.4. After the end of the federal grant,
it continued on a fee-for-service basis. Id. The Exorcism article examined a number of additional
proficiency tests in reaching the conclusions in the quoted paragraphs above. See supra notes 44-46
and accompanying text. While the Exorcism article was examining all tested aspects of handwriting
expertise; I am limiting myself to the specific task of signature authentication.
56. See infra Part III.
57. For examples of difficult tasks on which experts performed no better than what would be
expected by chance, see Oliver Galbraith III et al., The Principle of the "Drunkard's Search" as a
Proxy for Scientific Analysis: The Misuse of Handwriting Test Data in a Law JournalArticle, I INT'L J.
FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINERS 7, 14-16 (1995).

58. CTS REPORT No. 85-8, supra note 55. Professor Michael Risinger kindly provided me with
copies of the CTS summary reports on this test and on the 1988 CTS test discussed below. The
summary reports are the feedback given collectively to participating laboratories. They contain brief
introductory remarks, the scenarios posed in the tests, the correct answers, and the results for
individual laboratories (laboratory anonymity is protected by a coding system). Reports on the tests
are not otherwise published. Risinger, supra note 5, at 521-22.
59. Risinger et al., supra note 44, at 745-76.
6o. Galbraith III et al., supra note 57, at 7.
61. Risinger, supra note 5, at 383.
62. C'S REPORT No. 85-8, supra note 55, at 4-9. The proposition in text is this Author's inference
from reading the narrative answers of the text takers.
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signed the signature on checks #3 and #8.63 All of the other checks were
signed by different people. Checks #6 and #ii were (depending on the
packet) either tracings or freehand simulations of the signatures on
checks #3 and #8. All of the other checks were apparently written in the
natural hand of the subjects, without any attempt to disguise the hand or
imitate the hand of someone else. 64 The test takers were asked "[w]hich,
if any, of the twelve checks were written by the same person?" 6' The
correct answer was "3 and 8." 66
Forty-one percent of the respondents answered that checks #3 and
#8 (and only those checks) were written by the same person; 31% were
not able to reach a conclusion;
and the others reached a conclusion, but
67
made one or more mistakes.
These results can be characterized in different ways. One way is to
say that the experts were correct only 41 % of the time. A more generous
way would be to discard the inconclusives, and say that the experts were
correct 59% of the time. 68 (Many of the labs that gave inconclusive
responses complained about the nature of the materials. The labs had to
base their conclusions upon the twelve checks alone, and were not able
to request additional exemplars of the signature of Elizabeth J.
Drinkwalter.) 69
Either way, the results indicate that the experts are not infallible.
But, of course, expertise doesn't have to be infallible to be helpful. And
the error rate can be viewed in many different ways, depending on how
one slices the subtasks. An even more generous way of viewing the
results would be to disaggregate the specific decisions made by the
experts in each comparison of hands.
By analogy, suppose a teacher gives a multiple-choice test containing
fifty questions. There are different ways that results could be reported.
One could calculate the percentage of students who got any of the fifty
questions wrong, and report that as the error rate. A more customary
approach would be to treat each question as a separate task, and report
the error rate as the mean percentage of questions answered incorrectly.
With that in mind, it is worth contemplating what a document
examiner had to do in order to achieve a completely correct answer on
63. Id. at 2 tbl.i.
64. This is the Author's inference from the description of the task in the manufacturer's
information. See id.
65. Id. at 2 tbl.2.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Galbraith III et al., supra note 57, at 1i, 14. The Galbraiths calculate the percentage
correct in alternative ways, first by discarding inconclusives (their method i, yielding 59% correct),
then by analyzing the inconclusive results to see whether the document examiners gave qualified
opinions of authorship (their method 2, yielding 55% correct). Id.
69. See CTS REPORT No. 85-8, supra note 55, at I.
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the 1985 CTS test. The document examiners received twelve signatures
and were asked to identify the ones that had common authorship. The
completely correct answer was that checks #3 and #8 were written by the70
same person, but none of the other checks had common authorship.
Making the test more difficult, check #6 was a freehand simulation of the
signature on one of the matching checks (#3 or #8), and check #i I was a
tracing one of the matching check signatures."
Based only on signatures (no extra exemplars), the document
examiner would have to decide that two (and only two) of the signatures
were produced by the same person, just on the basis of the two signatures
themselves without the aid of additional writing samples. 72 Then the
examiner would have to reject all the other signatures as being
nonmatches, including two signatures that were freehand forgeries or
tracings of the two signatures that were written by the same person. Since
the examiners were free to say that all or none of the signatures matched
each other,73 there were 4,084 possible answers to the question, and the
random chance of getting a completely correct answer would be 1/4o84. 74
The experts clearly outperformed chance on this task. To put it another
way: the experts who gave a completely correct answer performed with
ioo% accuracy on many subtasks. Even those who gave partly wrong
answers performed correctly on most of the subtasks. If each of the
subtasks had been considered a separate decision, then the mean
accuracy rate across decisions would have been much higher than that
derived from counting all the subtasks as if they were one decision.
To do this, let us first place the errors into two categories: (i)
Making a mistaken same-source decision when the signatures come from
different sources (the signatures were written by different people, but the
FDE decides that they were written by the same person); and (2) Making
a mistaken different-source identification when the signatures come from
the same source (the signatures were written by the same person, but the
FDE decides they were written by different individuals).
We can now disaggregate the tasks by conceiving of the 1985 test as
one that requires the FDEs to make sixty-six decisions about whether
pairs of signatures were written by the same person. Thus, the FDE
subjects had to decide whether signature i had the same source as
signature 2, whether signature I had the same source as signature 3, etc.
For the 1985 test, the completely correct answer was that one of the
signature pairs had the same source (signatures 3 and 8 were written by
the same person), and that none of the other signature pairs had the
70. See supra note 66.

71. See CrS REPORT No. 85-8, supranote 55, at 2 tbl.i.
72. See id. at i.
73. See id.

74. Galbraith III et al., supra note 57, at t4.

HeinOnline -- 59 Hastings L.J. 1115 2007-2008

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 59:110o1

same source.
Viewed this way, the results of the FDE decisions as to whether
pairs of signatures came from the same source were as follows:75
TABLE

I: 1985 CTS TEST
DECISION

GROUND TRUTH
SAME SOURCE

NOT SAME SOURCE

SAME SOURCE

21

I

NOT SAME SOURCE

52

1,378

Thus, when the ground truth was that two signatures came from the
same source, the FDEs made twenty-one correct decisions and one
erroneous decision. When the ground truth was that the two signatures
did not come from the same source, the FDEs made 1,378 correct
decisions and fifty-two erroneous decisions (treating eight "possibly the
same source" decisions as incorrect).
Determining whether the signatures come from the same source is
the same task as determining whether a signature is authentic (though
with only one exemplar, a handicap for the FDEs). For example, when
an FDE compares signature 3 to signature 8 and decides they were
written by the same person, that is the same thing as treating signature 3
as a known exemplar of the person's signature and saying that signature
8 is genuine. Therefore, the two errors can fairly be described in terms of
the terminology used throughout this Article: the "false authentication
error" and the "false elimination error."
Using this terminology, the experts had the following error rates:
(i) False authentication error rate: 3.8% (of 1,430 pairs that did not
come from the same source, the FDEs erroneously decided that they
came from the same source fifty two times, and correctly decided that
they came from different sources 1,378 times).
(2) False elimination error rate: 4.5% (of twenty two pairs that did
come from the same source, the FDEs erroneously decided that they
came from different sources one time, and correctly decided that they
were from the same source twenty one times). 6
75. See CTS REPORT No. 85-8, supra note 55, at 2-3 tbl.2. I have excluded responses that declined
to express an opinion (e.g., "inconclusive" answers). This eliminated the data from ten responding
labs, leaving twenty-two respondents. That decision increased both the error rate and the correct
answer rate (compared with the alternatives of giving percentages for three categories: "correct,"
"inconclusive," and "error"). Where an answer said certain pairs of signatures came from the same
source and certain other pairs "possibly" came from the same source, I have treated the "possibly"
answers as being authentications. That was a decision that disfavored the document examiners. Had
the "possibly" answers been treated as exclusions, there would have been eight fewer same-source
errors.
76. See id.
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Some of the decisions were arguably easy, because they involved
finding that the natural handwriting of different people was different
(though it must be remembered that the FDEs had no exemplars, and
looked only at the twelve "signatures" written by eleven different
individuals). We can try to isolate the more difficult task (determining
whether a simulated signature was authentic) by breaking the false
authentication errors into two categories:
(I) False authentication of a nongenuine signature made with no
attempt at simulation."
(2) False authentication of a nongenuine signature made with an
attempt at simulation. 7s
Returning to the figures in Table I, when the ground truth was that
the signatures came from different sources, there were fifty-two false
authentication errors and 1,378 correct exclusions. But let us now focus
only on the pairs that came from different sources and in which the
signature writer made an attempt at simulation by tracing or free-hand
simulation.79 Each FDE faced five such pairs, so the twenty-two
respondents together faced a total of i io such pairs. In classifying these
iio intentional simulations, the FDE respondents made eighteen errors
(sixteen errors if two "possible" answers are excluded). 8' Thus, on this
task the FDEs produced ninety-two correct answers and eighteen errors,
for a I6% error rate.
Is this error rate too high? Answering that question requires a
healthy dollop of intuition. To me, the error rate seems acceptable, even
admirable, when we consider what the FDEs were being asked to do.
They were being asked to decide, on the basis of two "signatures"
containing the words "Elizabeth J. Drinkwalter," whether another
"signature" in the name of "Elizabeth J. Drinkwalter" was written by the
same author, when the third "signature" was in fact a conscious
imitation."' The FDEs had to detect, on the basis of this scanty
77. Technically, this should be described as "false authentication of handwriting of someone
signing another's name as the same handwriting as that contained on specimens provided by another
person who was signing a name not her own," an arguably harder task. See infra note I6I.
78. Technically, this should be described as "false authentication of the handwriting of someone
simulating specimens signed by a person who was not signing her own name," an arguably harder task.
See infra note 161.
79. Each of the twenty-two responding FDEs faced five such pairs. CTS RFPORT No. 85-8, supra
note 55, at 2-3 tbl.2. Depending on the test package, #6 was a simulation of either #3 or #8, and #ii
was a simulation of either #3 or #8. Id. at 2-3 tbls.i & 2. Since #3 and #8 were written by the same
person, I am treating a simulation of #3 as also being a simulation of #8, and vice versa. Also,
simulations of a signature from the same source are treated as simulations of each other (if you
disagree with this judgment, count four pairs instead of five). Thus, the five simulation pairs were 3-6,
3-11, 6-8, 6-1i, and 8-1t.
80. See id. at 2-3 tbl.2.
81. See id. at 2-3 tbls.i & 2. In order to have two signatures as known exemplars, the FDEs
needed first to determine that Drinkwalter Signature #3 was written by the same person as
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information, whether the third signature was different because of
intrawriter variation or because it was written by a different person. The
fact that they were fooled by the imitation only 16% of the time seems
rather good, considering the paucity of information.8,
Three obstacles made the tasks harder for the FDEs. One was the
absence of exemplars. Another was that the test takers worked from
photographs rather than originals. A third was that although all of the
"signatures" were specimens containing the name "Elizabeth J.
Drinkwalter," none of the signers, including the person who signed #3
and #8, was named "Elizabeth J. Drinkwalter. '' 83 If writers perform more
awkwardly (or with less individuality) when signing an unfamiliar name
than when signing a signature developed over a lifetime, then the use of a
false name may have been misleading. (In fact, one of the responses
stated: "Checks 3 and 8 could have been written by the same writer not
signing one's own name," though the expert thought that it was more84
likely that they were written by different writers having similar styles.)
In its report on the test, the testing agency conceded that "[i]n hindsight,
it may have been better if the name used had been the true name of the
person who wrote #3 and #8. " s'
In view of these difficulties, the test manufacturer's assessment is
one reasonable way of viewing the results. After noting the problem that
the test takers were unable to request additional signatures, the CTS
report states:
Despite these difficulties, thirteen laboratories gave responses
consistent with the manufacturer's information and an additional two
were only marginally different. Ten laboratories produced inconclusive
responses, largely because of the nature of the samples. Seven labs
gave responses at least partially inconsistent with the manufacturer's
information. Most of these results were a result of failure to recognize
the simulation in #6 and/or the tracing in #1i. The [Proficiency
Advisory Committee] was pleased to see that the majority of labs did
pick up on at least one of these simulations. 6
While the 1985 CTS test does not establish the value of the expertise, it
does not rebut it, either. The experts did much better than chance, and
even those who were partly wrong might have been helpful to juries by
pointing out features of the signatures. To borrow a term from some of
the test takers, the results were inconclusive.

Drinkwalter signature no. 8.
82. In fact, considering the lack of exemplars, one can make a case for treating "inconclusive"
answers as also being correct, in which case the error rate would shrink to ii
83. Id. at i.
84. Id. at 9 (answer of respondent 829).
85. Id. at i.
86. Id.
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The Forensic Science Foundation administered another proficiency
test relevant to signature authentication skills in 1988."7 The 1988 CTS
test was based on a fact scenario in which complaints were received from
physicians' offices about missing shipments of narcotics.8 The delivery
service produced four receipts containing four purported signatures in
the name of the secretary for each physician. s9 The respective secretaries
denied that they wrote the signatures.' Demand exemplars from the four
secretaries and the driver of the delivery truck were taken. 9' The delivery
service also provided two other receipts signed by unknown persons. 9'
The report on the 1988 CTS test does not state whether any of the
nongenuine signatures were simulations using as a model the genuine
signature. It is possible that the "delivery driver" Richard D. Osbourn
did not know what the signatures of the secretaries looked like, or at
least did not trace them or make free-hand simulations.
Like the report on the 1985 CTS test, the report on the 1988 test
does not provide the stimulus materials (the photos of the signatures and
exemplars). I have inferred which names were used for the signatures on
the receipts from the comments of the test takers. 93
A fuller description of the 1988 CTS test appears in Appendix 3.
Here, I will consider only the portions of the test that bear on the task
that is the subject of this Article: signature authentication.
On that particular task, a complete set of correct answers would
have been:
(i) The receipt QI, signed with the name "Sharon D. Clayborne,"
was not signed by Sharon D. Clayborne.
(2) The receipt Q2, signed with the name "Lisa D. Bridgeforth," was
indeed signed by Lisa D. Bridgeforth.
(3) The receipt 03, signed with the name "Cynthia Y. Boone," was
not signed by Cynthia Y. Boone.
(4) The receipt Q4, signed with the name "Joanna Neuman," was
indeed signed by Joanna Neuman.
The text of the CTS report does not itself state the percentage of
correct answers on each of the four tasks listed above. However, it does
state the answers given by each lab. I have hand tabulated those answers,
87. CTS REPORT No. 88-5, supra note 55.
88. Id. at 40.

89. Id.
90. Id.
i
9 . Id.
92. Id.
93. I checked my work against Professor Risinger's tabulation of names. Our results were the
same. See Risinger, supra note 5, at 522.
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with the results set forth below. Where the correct answer was that the
receipt was indeed signed by the person whose name appears in it, I have
counted "was written by" and "was probably written by" as being correct
answers. Where the correct answer was that the receipt was not signed by
the person whose name appears in it, I have counted "was not written
by" and "was probably not written by" as being correct answers. Where
the test taker left the answer space blank but indicated elsewhere that
the questioned signature was or probably was written by someone other
than the person whose name appears in the signature, I counted that
answer as a determination that the signature was not authentic.
Placing the four signature authentication tasks into the two
categories used in this Article, and counting only "called answers,"94 the
error rate was:
(i) False authentication error:

i%

(1/96)

6% (4/71)
False elimination error:
The test takers had various complaints about the test.9' For example,
they were furnished with photographs of the signatures instead of the
originals, and some of the takers complained that this made analysis of
certain features more difficult. 6 Others noted that the exemplars were
made upon request (i.e., they were demand exemplars, made at one
sitting by a subject who would realize that they were going to be used for
handwriting comparison) and wished they also had course-of-business
exemplars (examples of natural handwriting made over a period of time
without forensic tests in mind).7
After the end of the Justice Department Program for proficiency
testing, the CTS administered a number of other proficiency tests as a
private company on a fee-for-service basis. 8 If inconclusives are
discarded, these tests indicate a correct answer rate exceeding 90% on
signature authentication tasks, and on some of the comparisons ioo% of
the FDEs were correct.' The exception is one of the tasks on the 2001
(2)

94. For a more detailed tabulation, see Appendix 3. "Called" answers are ones that state whether
the signature is authentic or not, as opposed to "inconclusive" answers and other answers that do not
decide the authentication issue. In calculating the percentage of correct answers, my inclination is to
exclude the "inconclusive" and "other" answers. With one exception, the "other" answers either
leaned toward the right answer or called for more evidence. The "inconclusive" answers may have also
been based on the view that the evidence was insufficient. That is not necessarily a wrong answer. For
example, if Ms. Neuman did in fact have a simple signature that she signed with significant variation, it
seems reasonable to call for more exemplars or to conclude that the evidence was not enough for a
conclusion.
95. CI'S REPORT No. 88-5, supra note 55, at 34-39 tbl5.

96. Id. at 34-38 tbl.5.
97. See id.
98. See supra note 55.
99. See Risinger, supra note 5, at 558-65 (discussin COLLABORATIVE TESTING SERVS., QUESTIONED
DOCUMENTS
DOCUMENTS

ANALYSIS, REPORT No. 92-6 (1992); COLLABORATIVE TESTING SERVS., QUESTIONED
EXAMINATION, REPORT No. 94o6 (1994); COLLABORATIVE TESTING SERVS., QUESTIONED
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CTS proficiency test." There, the three questioned documents were
entries on a "sign-in log" that included a signature purporting to be the
signature of Kenny Bania as well as handwritten numbers denoting date
and time.'' The FDEs who took the test had been provided with
exemplars from Bania and from two other persons, but not from the
person who simulated Bania's signature.' 2
Entries QI and Q3 had in fact been written by Kenny Bania." Entry
02 was a freehand simulation of Kenny Bania's signature and number
writing.04 The FDEs were ioo% correct (with no inconclusive answers)
in saying that Kenny Bania had in fact written QI and Q3 . "°5 However,

their results were far less good when they reached the signature
authentication task required in Q2.' °o On that task, seventy-five
respondents (78.5%) correctly answered that Bania did not or probably
did not write the questioned signature,' 7 but twenty (21.5%) identified
DOCUMENTS EXAMINATION, REPORT

No. 96o6

(1996); COLLABORATIVE TESTING SERVS., FORENSIC TESTING

PROGRAM, HANDWRITING EXAMINATION, REPORT No. 9714 (1997); COLLABORATIVE TESTING SERVS.,
FORENSIC TESTING PROGRAM: HANDWRITING EXAMINATION, REPORT No. 9814 (1998); COLLABORATIVE
TESTING SERVS., FORENSIC TESTING PROGRAM: HANDWRITING EXAMINATION, TEST No. 99-524 (1999);
COLLABORATIVE TESTING SERVS., FORENSIC TESTING PROGRAM: HANDWRITING EXAMINATION, TEST No. 00524 (2000); COLLABORATIVE TESTING SERVS., FORENSIC TESTING PROGRAM: HANDWRITING EXAMINATION,
TEST No. 01-524 (2001)

[hereinafter CTS TEST No. 01-524] (on file with author); COLLABORATIVE
TESTING SERVS., FORENSIC TESTING PROGRAM: HANDWRITING EXAMINATION, TEST No. 02-524 (2003)).

IOO. See CTS TEST No. 01-524, supra note 99. In my description, I have extracted the parts of the
task that relate to the narrow task of signature authentication as I have defined it (determining
whether the person named in the signature wrote the signature), and not to the other task presented in
the test-that of deciding whether a simulated signature should be attributed to someone else. The
attribution task may have made the authentication task more difficult on Q2, because none of the
exemplars of other persons apparently suspected of simulating the signature were exemplars of the
person who did simulate the signature, so the examinee who assumed that either the real Kenny Bania
or one of the other suspects was the one who wrote the signature would have been led astray. This
problem could, of course, also cause error in ordinary casework.
ioI. Id. at 2-4.
102. Id. at 2.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. On Q1,94% (123/131) accurately responded that Kenny Bania was the writer, and 6% (8/131)

responded that he probably wrote the entry. Id. at 7. On Q3, 93% (122/t31) accurately responded that
Kenny Bania was the writer, and 7% (9/131) responded that he probably wrote the entry. Id. at 13.
lO6. Twenty FDEs positively eliminated him, fifty-five opted for probable elimination. Id. at io.
One reason why it may have been harder for the FDEs to eliminate than it was for them to identify is
the possibility that the person named in the signature actually wrote the signature, but in a disguised
hand so as to be able to later deny writing it. Id. at 3. Thus the detection of signs of simulation does not
conclusively exclude the possibility that the person whose name appears in the signature did in fact
write the signature. Sometimes the other case facts might make writing in a disguised hand highly
unlikely, and this may be a situation in which it would be appropriate, at some point, to give the FDE
access to other case facts even if those facts are initially screened so as to prevent observer bias. For
example, cases involving allegedly forged wills are probably ones in which it seems highly unlikely that
the real decedent will have signed her own signature in a disguised hand.
io7. I am describing it as a questioned signature even though the signature was actually
accompanied by a few numbers. To be precise, the task was whether to authenticate the signature and
its accompanying numbers, but the signature seems to have provided most of the relevant information
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him as the author of the questioned signature and there were thirty-six
inconclusive answers.

o8

Thus, the error rates for the called opinions were:
(i) False authentication error:

22%

(20/95)

0%
(0/262)
False elimination error:
Not surprisingly, this proficiency test shows a much higher rate of
false authentication error than the tests in which the signers apparently
made no attempt to imitate a genuine signature. One lesson that can be
drawn from the proficiency tests is that a forger who imitates a genuine
signature will sometimes succeed.
The 2001 Australian study by Found and Rogers also provides error
rate data for intentional simulations." There, on the task of detecting
genuine signatures as genuine, the FDEs were 92% correct, 6%
inconclusive, and 2% affirmatively wrong."' On the task of detecting that
nongenuine signatures were simulations, they were 43% correct, 53%
inconclusive, and 4% affirmatively wrong."' (The nongenuine signatures
were freehand forgeries by naive forgers who were allowed to practice
as a model.)" ' Discarding inconclusives, the
using a genuine signature
3
(2)

accuracy rate was:''
(i) Simulated as simulated:
(2) Genuine as genuine:

91.5 %
98.2%

In other words:
8.5%
(i) False authentication error:
1.8%
(2) False elimination error:
A third category of signature in the 200T Found & Rogers study was
the "disguised" signature." 4 A disguised signature is a signature in the
true name of the specimen writer, but written in a disguised hand."5 It is
the kind of signature that might be written, for example, by a receipt
signer who was signing her true name, but who wanted to make the
signature look as if someone else had signed it, so that she could later
for performing the task.
1o8. See CTS TEST No. 01-524, supra note 99, at xo.
to9. My description of the Found and Rogers study comes from examination of a printout of a
presentation setting forth their results. See BRYAN FOUND & DOUG ROGERS, REVISION AND CORRECIVE
ACTION PACKAGE: SIONATURE TRIAL 2001 (on file with author). This study was distributed on CD-ROM
by the Forensic Expertise Profiling Laboratory, School of Human Biosciences, La Trobe University,
Australia, and provided to this Author by Michael Risinger.
iio. Id. at 26 tbl.2. The raw scores were 1,628 correct, 30 wrong, and 105 inconclusive. Id. at 25
tbl. i.
II. Id. at 26 tbl.2. The raw scores were 2,840 correct, 265 wrong, and 3455 inconclusive.
112. Id. at 12.
II3. Id. at 26 tbl.2.
114. Id. at 8.
115. Id. at 9.
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deny having signed it. Here the results were much more mixed. Of the
FDEs tested, 29.6% correctly assigned authorship to the specimen writer,
23.9% incorrectly said she was not (or probably not) the author, and
46.4% answered "inconclusive."' 6 Discarding "inconclusives" and using
only called opinions, 55.3% were correct and 44.7% incorrect." 7 This
data suggests that assigning authorship to disguised handwriting is a
much harder task than determining whether a signature was written in
the natural and usual style of the signer. In cases where self-disguise is a
realistic possibility, perhaps signature authentication experts should only
be allowed to state an opinion about whether (i) the signature is the
naturally written signature of the person named in the signature; or (2)
there are signs of disguise or simulation. This restriction would mean that
the experts would not be allowed to assign authorship to disguised or
simulated writing.
Without seeing the raw stimulus materials (the questioned
signatures and known exemplars), it is difficult make even an intuitive
judgment about how hard the tests I have discussed were. They might be
too hard, too easy, or just right. (Even if I had access to the original
stimulus materials, my intuitive judgments about difficulty would
probably be wrong; all FDE tasks seem hard to me.) Moreover, the
proficiency tests discussed above do not compare expert performance
with lay performance, and hence do not tell us much about whether it
would be better to use an expert or have the jury do the signature
authentication alone. Third, participation in proficiency testing is
voluntary, and it is difficult to estimate the effect of selection bias. The
labs that requested and returned materials might have been the best labs,
a reasonable inference in view of the fact that they were interested in
testing their performance. But they might have been the least busy labs,
or labs that wanted to test trainees, or labs that had something to prove
and want to be able to say that they had passed proficiency tests. The
labs that requested but did not return materials might have been the ones
that found the test too hard, or they might have intended from the
beginning to use the tests for future training when they were not so busy.
Finally, there are problems with generalizing the test results to actual
casework. Perhaps the test takers were more careful in doing the tests
than they would be in actual casework, or more prone to give
"inconclusive" opinions than in actual casework. In actual casework,
where the FDEs typically know the other evidence in the case and the
result that the prosecution would like to have, biasing effects might well
convert some of the "inconclusives" to positive answers (or even change
the positive answer to their opposites)."" On the other hand, in actual
II6. Id. at 26 tbl.2.
117. Id. at 26 tbl.2.
118. See Risinger et al., supra note 20, at 2.
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casework the FDEs might benefit from being able to request additional
exemplars or from being able to use original signatures and exemplars
instead of photographs.
Another reason to hesitate before using existing proficiency test data
inferences about the validity of the expertise is the possible effect on the
tests themselves. The current commercial test makers (CTS) eschew any
claim that the test results are valuable in assessing the field, and in fact
warn against using them for that purpose."9 As noted above, one of the
reasons why it is difficult to draw conclusions from proficiency test
results is that the tests may be too hard or too easy. That quality is
manipulable. A test maker could intentionally devise a test that would
result in a i% error rate or a 99% error rate. The test maker who is
trying to actually test proficiency aims at something in between. The CTS
test makers are aware of this factor (though their recent tests seem to
have been on the easy end of the spectrum). This can be seen in their
"summary comments" to Test No. 01-524 (2001), where they proudly
quote the comment of a test taker who said, "This is an excellent
problem. A mistake awaits anyone who is not cautious and thorough."'"
After noting that the test taker who made that flattering comment had a
perfect score on the test, they note that another test taker who criticized
the test as "too easy" was wrong on a crucial answer.''
That is exactly the attitude that we want the test makers to have.
They should strive to create a reasonably difficult test that will cause
mistakes by those who are not careful, thorough, and able. But if the
tests are used by doubters to attack the field, the test takers are unlikely
to compliment the tests for being difficult. They are more likely to
demand easy tests.
A program of proficiency testing could be devised that would be
both free of that danger and more informative in estimating an error
rate. Ideally, the program would be administered by persons with a
scientific background who are neutral in the sense that they have no
personal interest in either defending or disparaging FDE expertise.
Moreover, the program should be blind, meaning that the proficiency
tests are presented as if they were ordinary casework, so that the test

i19. See, e.g., CrS REPORT No. 88-5, supra note 55, at intro.
Since it is the laboratory's option how the samples are to be used (e.g., training exercise,
known or blind proficiency testing, research and development of new techniques), the
results compiled in the summary report are not intended to be an overview of the quality of
work performed in the profession , and cannot be interpreted as such.... They are included
for the benefit of participating laboratory directors to assist them with maintaining or
enhancing the quality of results from their individual laboratories. These comments are not
intended to reflect the general state of the art within the profession.
Id.
120. See CTS TEST No. 01-524, supra note 99, at 3.
121.

Id.
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takers do not know they are being tested.' However, blind testing that is
extensive enough to justify statistically sound conclusions about error
rates is likely to be expensive and difficult to implement.'23 One problem
is making the testing actually blind, when labs are accustomed to
interacting with investigators, for example by contributing investigative
leads and calling for more evidence to help them perform their FDE
comparisons.'2 4
Even with an extensive blind proficiency program, there would still
be unanswered questions. First, one would still not know how expert
performance compares with lay performance. Second, the aggregate
data, while useful, would not be definitive with regard to any particular
lab-the lab might be better (or worse) than the typical lab, or it might
be using newer methods (or discarding old ones). But perfection is
unattainable, and these issues could be explored in testimony. If enough
proficiency testing were done on enough specific subtasks, the results
would be useful, either in helping judges make the Daubert decision or in
informing juries of the possibilities of expert error.
III.
A.

STUDIES COMPARING EXPERT AND LAY PERFORMANCE

DESCRIPTION OF THE KAM AND SITA STUDIES

I will now discuss the studies comparing expert and lay performance
on the task of signature authentication.' 5 Probably the best-known study,
at least in the United States, is the study by Moshe Kam and colleagues,
SignatureAuthentication by Forensic Document Examiners, published in
2OOl. 26 In May 1998, Dr. Kam and his colleagues conducted a test of
signature authentication with sixty-nine FDE subjects and fifty lay
subjects.' 7 These subjects examined signatures that had been generated
by other participants. I 8 The stimuli-generating participants were
graduate and undergraduate students at Drexel University who were
122. See Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Feasibility of External Blind DNA Proficiency Testing:
Background and Findings, 48 J. FORENSIC SCIS. 21, 26 (2003) (presenting data indicating that in a
variety of forensic fields, blind testing yields fewer positive calls than open testing).
123. For similar problems with blind proficiency testing by DNA labs, see Margaret A. Berger,
Laboratory ErrorSeen Through the Lens of Science and Policy, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. io8i, lO88-89

(1997).

See Risinger et al., supra note 20.
I have not included the pilot study comparing expert and lay performance set forth in
Galbraith III et al., supra note 57, at 7, on grounds that it did not involve a signature authentication
task.
126. Kam et al., supra note 54. Dr. Kam has done other studies comparing expert and lay
performance on assignment of authorship to naturally written nonsignature handwriting, but those
studies are not directly relevant to signature authentication, and they had methodological problems
involving differential lay and expert incentives that were not present in the same degree in the 2001
study. For a description of these earlier studies, see Risinger, supra note 5, at 527-49.
127. Kam et al., supra note 54, at 884.
128. Id. at 885-86.
124.
125.
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paid $25 for three hours' work.'29 Each of those participants provided
twelve "freely and naturally executed" examples of his or her own
signature.'3 ° (These were divided randomly into six-signature subsets.)' 3'
Seven other participants were hired to simulate those signatures "using
the manual techniques described in a text of forensic document
examination.' 3. They were provided with tracing paper, carbon paper,
flashlights, and overhead projectors.'33 The simulators had no known
prior experience in simulating signatures.'34 Each simulator was given six
genuine signatures and allowed as much time as they wanted to practice
the simulation.'33 The investigators obtained professional FDEs from
three different FDE conferences to act as FDE subjects.': The lay
subjects were staff, faculty, and students from Drexel University.'37 All
test takers were given a known set of six genuine signatures and told that
they had been provided voluntarily by the signer in a single sitting.':
They were also given an unknown set of six signatures (i.e., questioned
signatures).'39 The unknown set could be all genuine signatures, all
simulated signatures, or anything in between.'4 °
Subjects were given decision choices of "identification," "strong
probability [did write]," "elimination," and "strong probability did not
write..'.

They were also given an inconclusive option.'42

The FDE and lay performance compared as follows:
TABLE

II:

KAM ET AL., 2001
DECISION

GROUND TRUTH

GENUINE
NOT GENUINE

129.

INCONCLUSIVE

GENUINE

FDE

LAY

FDE

LAY

85.89%

70.00%
6.47%

7.05%
3.45%

4.30%
1.4o%

0.49%

NOT GENUINE

FDE

LAY

7.05% 26.1o%
96.o6% 92.00%

Id. at 885.

130. Id.
131. Id.
132.

Id. at 885 (citing W. HARRISON,

FORGERY DETECTION:

A

PRACTICAL GUIDE (1964)).

133. Id. at 885.

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 885-86.
137. ld. at 886.

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142.

Id.

143. Id. at 887. The differences in error rates for the FDE and lay subjects were statistically
significant. Id.
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TABLE

III:

KAM ET AL., 2001" CALLED DECISIONS
DECISION

GROUND TRUTH

GENUINE

FDE

j

NOT GENUINE

LAY

FDE

LAY

GENUINE

92.41%

72.84%

7.59%

27.16%

NOT GENUINE

0.51%

6.57%

99.49%

93.43%

These tables show that when the questioned signature was in fact
genuine, the FDEs correctly said it was genuine 85.89% of the time, said
"inconclusive" 7.05% of the time, and made the false elimination error in
7.05% of their decisions. If we exclude the inconclusives, then the FDEs
were correct in 92.41% of decisions, and made the false elimination error
in 7.59% of decisions. Lay subjects were correct on 72.84% of these calls,
and made the false elimination error on 27.16% of them. When the
questioned signature was in fact a simulation, the FDEs made the false
authentication error 0.49% of the time, said "inconclusive" 3.45% of the
time, and correctly designated it as nongenuine in 96.06% of the
decisions. If we exclude the inconclusives, then the FDEs were correct in
99.49% of decisions, and incorrect in o.5I% of decisions. The
comparable figures for lay subjects are 93.43% and 6.57%.
A 1999 Australia-New Zealand pilot study by Bryan Found, Jodi
Sita, & Doug Rogers reached similar results, though with higher rates of
inconclusive answers. I" There, seven document examiners and eight lay
persons were asked to make judgments about the authenticity of each of
I5o questioned signatures.' 45 The overall error rate of the lay subjects was
28%, compared to 2% for the document examiners. I46 The lay error rate
for the false authentication error was 7%, compared to 0% for the
document examiners. 47 The lay error rate for the false elimination error
was 21%, as opposed to 2% for the document examiner group."44 The
document examiner group was considerably more conservative in
making "calls" and had a much higher "inconclusive" rate than the lay
group.'4 9 Although I have examined the published study, I cannot report
exact figures for "inconclusive" answers because they are presented in a
bar-graph table that does not make very fine distinctions. However, it
appears that the FDEs gave about seventy "inconclusive" answers,
compared to about forty "inconclusive" answers by the lay subjects. The
differences between the lay errors and the FDE errors were statistically
144. Bryan Found et al., The Development of a Programfor CharacterizingForensic Handwriting
Examiners' Expertise: Signature Examination Pilot Study, 12 J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION 69,
75-76 (1999).
145. Id. at 72.
146. Id. at 76.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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significant, as were the differences between lay "inconclusives" and FDE
"inconclusives."' 5 The lay subjects actually gave more correct answers
than the FDE subjects (about seventy eight as compared to about eighty
two) but the difference was not statistically significant. '
The same authors followed up with a larger study in 2002.152 (My
comments from now on will concern the larger study, not the pilot
study.) There, seventeen FDEs from five Australian and New Zealand
government forensic laboratories and thirteen lay subjects participated.'53
Ten volunteers each executed thirty free-hand, natural signatures over a
twelve-month period.'54 Twenty-five other volunteers made freehand
simulations of those signatures, with as much time as they wanted to
practice.'55 The simulators then submitted a "one-off" simulation
executed on a specially marked sheet reserved for a single try, and a
"best try" simulation that they thought to be their best forgery.' Test
packages were prepared that called for the FDEs and the lay subjects to
perform the signature authentication task.'57 A judgment of genuine,
5
simulated, or inconclusive was elicited for each questioned signature.'
For reasons that are unclear, the authors of the Sita study did not
compare lay performance to expert performance in the same categories
used by Kam. The errors of false identification and false elimination
were combined, as were the correct answers of detecting genuine as
genuine and detecting simulated as simulated.'59 The results were as
follows:
(i) FDE: 54.8% correct, 41.8% inconclusive, 3.4% wrong
57.1% correct, 23.6% inconclusive, 19.3% wrong
(2) Lay:
Note that the lay persons again actually made a higher percentage of
correct decisions than the experts, though the results were not
statistically significant. The exEerts were superior in avoiding error, to a
statistically significant degree.'
If one counts only "called" opinions (that is, if inconclusives are
excluded) then the error rates compare as follows:
(i) FDE: 5.8% errors
25.3% errors
(2) Lay:
150. Id. at 71.
The lay subjects had a higher percentage of both correct answers and wrong answers because
i51.
the experts made more frequent use of the option of answering "inconclusive."
152. Sita et al., supra note 54, at i 117.

153. Id. at iiI8.
154. Id.
155. Id.
I56. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.

159. Id. at ill9.
16o. Id.
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Differences between lay and expert error rates were statistically
significant.
As in the Kam study, the FDE subjects in the Sita study made
significantly more errors in false elimination (calling a genuine signature
to be not genuine) than they did in false authentication (calling a
simulated signature genuine).' 6' The called error rate for false elimination
was 12.2%, as opposed to 2.1% for false authentication. 62 The data
comparing false elimination and false authentication for lay persons are
not set forth in the report of the study.
The Kam study and the Sita study differ greatly in the percentage of
"inconclusive" answers. It is not clear why this should be so, at least for
the FDE subjects. (The lay subjects in the Sita study were given
cautionary instructions that may have encouraged inconclusive answers.)
There is no obvious difference in the test materials that can be detected
by examining the investigators' published accounts, which do not include
photographs of the questioned signatures and specimens. Kam collected
a set of twelve freely and naturally executed genuine exemplars for each
signature; Sita collected a set of fifteen genuine exemplars (presumably
also freely and naturally executed) for each signature.6 The simulators
were naive simulators in both studies.' Perhaps the Australia/New
Zealander document examiners in the Sita study required a higher
degree of certainty before rendering an opinion than the American FDE
examiners in the Kam study. Perhaps the Sita subjects, in "psyching out"
the Sita test, thought that it was going to be a particularly difficult one.
The Sita test materials hinted that some of the signatures might be
disguised signatures by the person whose name was signed, and that one
of the tasks involved might be to distinguish between a "natural"
signature by the person whose name is written as the questioned
signature and a "simulated" signature authored by the person whose
name is written as the questioned signature."'6 A previous study by two of
161. Id. at i18-19. For consistency of terminology, I am continuing to use the categories of "false
authentication" and "false elimination," even though technically the errors might be described as
"false missing of simulation" and "false detection of simulation." The reason is that the study asked
the subjects to distinguish between "genuine" signatures and "simulated" signatures. They were
instructed to answer "genuine" when "[t]he questioned signature is in your opinion written by the
same person who wrote the standard signature group" and to answer "simulated" when "[t]he
questioned signature is inconsistent with the standard signature group and displays features that you
consider to be indicative of a copying process. Note that this term does not imply that the standard
signature writer did not write it." Id. at 1118. This instruction seems hard to follow, even illogical (a
person who traced his own signature would fall in both categories), and I am assuming that subjects
called signatures "genuine" when they thought the signature had been written by the person named in
the signature, and "simulated" when they thought the signature was not genuine.
62. Id. at 1120 tbl.5 . The comparable called error rates in the 2001 Kam study were 7.59% for
false elimination and o.5o% for false authentication. See Kam et al., supra note 54, at 887.
163. Sita et al., supra note 54, at 118.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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the same authors had included a task of detecting disguised signatures
written by the specimen writer, a task that had a high error rate.' 66 Or it
may simply be that, for some reason not apparent on the face of the
published studies, the task in the Sita study was harder than the task in
the Kam study.
B.

COMMENTS ON THE KAM AND SITA STUDIES

There are various ways to describe the difference between FDE and
lay performance. The difference seems most impressive if one compares
the ratio of errors. Table 4 shows the ratio for called opinions on the
2001 Kam study:
TABLE

IV:

ERROR

KAM ET AL., 2001: ERROR RATIOS
EDE
LAY

ERROR RATIO (LAY

TO FDE)
FALSE
AUTHENTICATION

O51%

6.57%

12.9 TO I

7.50%

27.16%

3.6 TO I

FALSE
ELIMINATION

The most dramatic ratio difference is in the false authentication
error. The lay subjects were over thirteen times as likely to make the
error of saying that a simulated document was genuine. But in absolute
terms the error rate was not very high for either FDEs or lay subjects.
The Sita study, in its comparison between FDE and lay
performance, does not distinguish between the two types of error.' 67 The
aggregate data are set forth in Table 5:
TABLE V: SITA ET AL., 200I: ERROR RATIOS
FDE

ERROR

LAY

ERROR RATIO (LAY

S

TO FDE)

FALSE AUTHENTICATION
OR FALSE ELIMINATION

3.4%

19.3%

57 TO I

Both studies show FDEs making significantly fewer errors than the
lay subjects. But the path from these studies to the conclusion that expert
testimony would be helpful at trial is strewn with pitfalls.
First, there is the bothersome question of what to do with the
"inconclusive" answers. The experts were far more likely to say
"inconclusive" than the lay subjects in both studies. If "inconclusive" is
considered a wrong answer, then the difference between expert and lay
performance shrinks.
I66. FOUND & ROGERS, supra note 109, at 8.
167. Sita et al., supra note 54, at 1120-21.
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The question whether to consider "inconclusive" as a wrong answer
is difficult, a difficulty that is compounded by the fact that an
examination of the question would involve using the expertise to judge
the expertise. A comparison with fingerprint identification may illustrate
the point.
Suppose that a fingerprint expert is asked to make a comparison of a
complete set of ten carefully rolled prints with another complete set of
ten carefully rolled prints from the same subject. If the expert states that
the comparison is "inconclusive," then it seems fair to deem that result
erroneous (unless one is a strong skeptic of the value of any fingerprint
comparisons). But suppose that the expert is asked to compare a sparse
latent print with the subject's rolled print. Even if the latent print comes
from the same subject, it seems perverse always to label an
"inconclusive" answer as wrong. The "inconclusive" answer simply
means that there is not enough data to make a decision. The expert may
be correct in saying that there is not enough data even if the prints come
from the same person. In fact, the more skeptical one is about the
technique of identification, the less ready one should be to call an
"inconclusive" answer wrong. Judging whether an inconclusive answer is
"wrong" involves using expertise to determine whether the expert's
answer was not up to standard.
In handwriting identification, one reason for an "inconclusive"
answer may be that the expert has simply not been provided with enough
exemplars. This was the reason given by FDEs for some of the
"inconclusives" in the 1985 CTS proficiency test.' 68 This might explain
some of the "inconclusives" in the Kam 2001 and Sita 2002 studies, even
though the FDEs were given six and fifteen exemplars in the respective
studies. But there are other justifiable reasons for an inconclusive
judgment. One is that the subject's signature has so much natural
intrawriter variation that it is unusually difficult to make a judgment.
Another is that the subject's signature is so simple and commonplace
that there is too great a danger of interwriter similarity.' 69 An expert who
reaches the "inconclusive" conclusion on those grounds might deserve
respect rather than criticism.'7 ° In part the answer depends upon that
ever-present but elusive decision about who gets the benefit of the doubt.
My intuition favors discarding the "inconclusive" answers, treating them
168. CTS REPORT No. 85-8,supra note 55, at 34.
169. See Sita et al., supra note 54, at 1122.
170. On the other hand, unless the test makers were intentionally asking FDEs whether signatures

were genuine or not without providing enough information to make the judgment, the experts that the
test makers consulted in devising the test must have thought that there was enough data to justify an
answer. Of course, it is possible that the test makers simply devised a plan for making the stimulus
materials (have people sign their signatures and other people imitate them) without giving any
subsequent thought to whether the results provided enough information for a judgment of
genuineness.
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as neither right nor wrong answers, but as nonresponses. Under this
approach, one counts only the "called" answers, the instances in which
the FDEs or lay subjects came to a conclusion. This has the effect of
increasing both the error rate and the correct answer rate (compared to
the alternative of using three categories, "correct," "inconclusive," and
''erroneous").
The document examiners may have had greater motivation to give
inconclusive answers in the study environment than did the lay subjects.
Discarding the "inconclusives" partly compensates for these dangers by
increasing the error rate of subjects who use the "inconclusive" category
(their error rate is a percentage of their total affirmative decisions, not a
percentage of all three categories). Nonetheless, using the "inconclusive"
category might still be a good strategic move for test takers when they
are really in doubt (but leaning in one direction) and when the aimed-for
error rate is very low. Perhaps the solution is to design tests in which lay
people give as many "inconclusive" answers as FDEs. This could be done
by fiddling with financial incentives, or by doing a separate measure in
which the lay subjects rate their degree of certainty and the investigator
uses the certainty measure as a way of assigning the desired percentage
of lay answers to the inconclusive category.
The greater use of "inconclusives" by FDEs would not be a problem
if one could be sure that the study conditions generalize to trial
conditions. Recognition that comparisons are inconclusive would be a
contribution that experts could make to the process, counteracting a lay
tendency to jump to conclusions. The problem is that FDEs may be more
cautious in test conditions than they are in real casework, especially if in
real casework they are exposed to extraneous information. This is part of
the larger problem of external validity discussed below in Part III.D.
C. CHALLENGES TO INTERNAL VALIDITY

There is a danger, in both the Kam 2001 study and the Sita 2002
study, that something other than expertise caused the differences in
performance. Possibilities include differences in age or background that
are not related to the expertise. The most disturbing possibility, however,
is that differences in motivation caused the difference in performance, by
causing the FDEs to take the task more seriously than the lay subjects
and to work longer and harder at it.
First, the FDEs may have feared that word of mistakes in individual
performance might leak out, leading either to impeachment at trial or to
their competency being called into question by supervisors or peers.
Both studies appear to have made an effort to prevent this result.
Second, FDEs are aware of the challenges that have been made to the
field on which they depend for their livelihood, and they would want the
study outcome to show them performing well. Moreover, their self-
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esteem would take a blow if the test indicated that they were not skilled
at what they do for a living, whereas the lay subjects are not likely to care
very much whether they are good at signature identification tasks.
Dr. Kam made a commendable effort to motivate the lay subjects
with money.'7 ' The lay subjects received $8 for each correct decision and
lost $8 for each affirmative error (indecision had a consequence of $o, $4,
or -$4 depending upon the incentive group to which the lay persons
belonged; the researchers did not detect any difference in performance
due to this difference).'72 While this addresses the problem, it probably
falls short of the incentives for document examiners. The Sita 2002 study
did not even try to solve the incentive problem. It gave no performancebased monetary rewards or punishments to subjects.'73

The incentive problem is hard to solve, short of giving huge
monetary rewards or using complicated deceptions (such as using a
signature authentication task as a mock entrance exam for an FDE
training program). The problem is, however, mitigated to some degree in
the legal policy context. If FDEs are not allowed to testify about
signature authentication tasks, then fact finders (judges or jurors) whose
careers are not at stake will make the signature comparisons. They may
not be as highly motivated as FDEs taking proficiency tests either; their
motivation may more closely resemble that of the lay subjects in the Kam
tests. Of course, jurors want to do justice, and they might be more
motivated than a student, even a scholarship student, who is susceptible
to a swing of $i6 if she decides to make an affirmative determination of
authenticity. But jurors want to go home. Self-interest is usually thought
to be a pretty good motivator. The Kam subjects had that spur and jurors
do not (or if they do, it points in the direction of going home). As is so
often the case, applying experimental results to a real-life legal context
depends ultimately upon unsystematic inductions from experiences and
introspection-what some would call "intuition."
Another challenge is self-selection among document examiners. It
may be that only the best examiners participate in studies such as those
conducted by Kam and Sita. Of course, there are other possibilities, and
there is a good dose of speculation in assessing this danger.
D.

CHALLENGES TO EXTERNAL VALIDITY

Even if the difference in results between the FDEs and the lay
subjects in the Kam and Sita studies is due to expertise and not to some
other factor, the results may not generalize to the pertinent legal context.
One reason is that FDEs may perform differently on proficiency
171. Kam et al., supra note 54, at 886.
172.

Id.

173. Sita et al., supra note 54, at

1123.
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tests than in actual casework. They may be more highly motivated to be
careful and thorough in proficiency tests. Moreover, in proficiency tests
their judgments are not affected by extraneous information. In actual
casework, FDEs are likely to have access to other information. For
example, they might know that a witness will testify that the defendant in
a forgery case made self-incriminating statements, or that other evidence
links the signer of a Western Union receipt to a drug ring. Their desire to
be a member of the prosecution team may also impair their judgment in
actual casework. Among other things, they may be less conservative in
giving "inconclusives" when the answer toward which they lean will help
the prosecution team.
These concerns are serious, though irreducibly speculative. It seems
likely that document examiners take proficiency tests more seriously
than real casework, but there is no conclusive proof. Some of them may
have a sense of justice that makes them try harder in real cases. Some of
them may be taking the proficiency exams under circumstances in which
there is no career harm if they make mistakes. And some real cases may
have higher consequences, because of the danger that document
examiners will be proven wrong. Where the document examiner gives an
opinion during the investigation process, for example, subsequent
information developed by the police may prove the opinion wrong. And
there is always a possibility that after trial, information will turn up that
disproves
their position, as appears to have happened in the Dreyfus
'74
case.
Finally, when generalizing from the results of the Kam study to
actual trial situations, one must ask whether the relatively accurate
performance of lay subjects on the task of correctly identifying
nongenuine signatures means that expert testimony is not worth a candle
at trial when the FDE is proffered for the purpose of opining that a
signature is not genuine. If the ground truth is that the signature is not
genuine, and the 2001 Kam test is used as the gauge of accuracy, then the
expert will contribute the correct decision 96% of the time, the lay
person 92%. If the prosecution is correct, then the lay jury will reach the
correct decision 92% of the time.'75 The difference between 92% and
96% may not be enough to justify the cost and time of involving an
expert, especially when one considers that the trial situation may be a
better one for lay decision making than the experimental situation. In the
trial situation, jurors have the benefit of group deliberation and
arguments of counsel. The arguments of counsel could be informed by
consultation with FDEs even if the FDE testimony were excluded. Points
174. See D.H. Kaye, Revising Dreyfus: A More Complete Account of a Trial by Mathematics, 91
M.NN. L. REv. 825,827-28.
175. See supra tbl.2. If inconclusives are discarded, the lay subjects were correct on 93.4% of their
calls, and the FDEs were correct on 99.5% of their calls. See supra tbl.3.
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that were overlooked in the solitary comparisons done by lay subjects in
the Kam and Sita studies might thus come to the jurors' attention.
Possibly the simulated signatures used in the 2001 Kam study were
crude and easy to detect, creating a ceiling effect that did not leave the
experts much room to excel. However, although error rates were low for
both FDEs and lay subjects, the lay subjects did make thirteen times as

many affirmative errors as the FDEs.,6 At any rate, if the FDEs are in
fact correct 96% of the time (or 99.5% if only called opinions are

counted)'77 then it is hard to say that their testimony would be very
prejudicial. The only question would be whether the testimony would be
worth the cost. In view of the fact that the alternative methods of proof
also have drawbacks and that the parties may incur costs by consulting
with FDEs even if the testimony is not admissible, 8 this does not seem
to be a compelling reason for excluding FDE testimony. It may, however,
be an additional reason for restricting FDE testimony to pointing out
similarities and differences, instead of allowing FDEs to state an ultimate
conclusion.'79
E.

THE 1975 CONRAD STUDY

A third article comparing expert and lay performance, Wolfgang
Conrad's 1975 study of German document examiners, 18° provides less
reason for being optimistic about the abilities of FDEs on the signature
authentication task. Conrad compared the results of twenty five "publicly
contracted and sworn experts" ranging in age from twenty-four to eightytwo years with that of lay persons with no handwriting background and
"
of university students who had taken handwriting courses.18
' The
participants were presented with materials containing genuine and
forged signatures and asked to reach a judgment about whether the
signatures were genuine. Some of the forgeries had been produced by
freehand procedure and others by tracing. Conrad reported that "the
quality of the forgeries on the whole exceeds the level usually found in
176. See supra tbl. 4 . The error rate for FDEs was 0.49%, for lay subjects 6.47%. The reason why
the correct answers and errors do not sum to too% is that subjects were also allowed to answer
"inconclusive." On this task, 3.45% of the FDE answers were inconclusive, compared to 1.40% of the
lay answers. See supra tbl.2.
177. See infra note 182.

178. See discussion infra Part IV.
179. See discussion infra Part IV.
18o. Wolfgang Conrad, Empirische Untersuchungen ilber die Urteilsgilte verschiedener Gruppen

von Laien und Sachverstdndigen bei der Unterscheidung authentischerund gefiilschter Unterschriften ,
156 ARCHrv FOR KRIMINOLOGIE 169-83 (1975), translated in Empirical Studies Regarding the Quality of
Assessments of Various Groups of Lay Persons and Experts in Differentiating Between Authentic and
Forged Signatures (Peter Bernhardt trans.) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). I am
grateful to Michael Saks for providing me with the English translation by Peter Bernhardt of Dr.
Conrad's article.
181. Id. at 2 (English translation).
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the judicial practice."
The most startling finding was that the university students had a
lower aggregate error rate than the generally-qualified experts (though
not lower than experts who were specially selected for accuracy on a
prior performance test). It is, however, unclear what weight should be
given to this result. First, the University students were students whose
qualifications were "successful completion of the classes Handwriting
Psychology I and II as well as Handwriting Comparison I and II."'' 8
Students with those qualifications may be more analogous to welleducated but inexperienced FDEs with systematic training in
handwriting comparison than to American jurors. Second, there were
only six subjects in the student comparison group, and the difference
between their performance and that of the experts was not statistically
significant.
experts 184 substantially
The twenty-five generally-qualified
outperformed one hundred "name owners fairly representing the adult
population of the Federal Republic of Germany"'185 and one hundred lay
persons who apparently were also representative of adult West
Germans.186 On the only comparison of the generally-qualified experts
with these lay groups, the twenty-five experts had a 14.7% error rate
compared to 34.4% for the general-population lay persons and 25% for
the actual "name owners" themselves. 87 However, when the generallyqualified FDEs were compared to lay persons with similar occupations
and education,' 88 the difference in performance was minor: the general
group of experts had a 14.7% error rate, and the similar-education-andprofession group of lay participants had an error rate of 20%. l19 When
only called opinions were used, the difference in error rates between
these two groups increased, but not very much. The general group of
experts had an error rate of io%, compared to an error rate of i8% for
the similar lay subjects. 90 (A small group of specially screened experts
Id. at 3.
183. Id. at 4 tbl i.
184. A small group of six specially screened experts did substantially better than the generallyqualified experts, and a group of sixteen specially qualified experts did somewhat better. Id. at 4 tbl. i.
182.

185. Id. at 2.
i86. Id. at 6.
187. Id. at 6 tbl.i. Inconclusives were counted as errors on this comparison, and the experts may
have suffered from use of this decision criteria, if, like the FDEs in the Kam and Sita studies, they
were more prone to give inconclusive answers than were lay participants.
188. The educational level of the twenty-five experts was as follows: three had finished elementary
school, six had received their general certificate of education from secondary school, and sixteen had
passed their "Abitur," or graduation exam from Gymnasium qualifying them for university entrance.
Of the "Abitur" experts, eleven had completed university studies. Id. at 2.

189. Id. at 6 tbl.i (counting inconclusives as wrong answers).
19o. See id. at 6 tbl.i. I am using Conrad's "error grade II" criteria, under which opinions were
called with a safety grade of probable or higher. In other words, I have excluded inconclusives but
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had an error rate of 2.8%, and a group of specially qualified experts had
an error rate of 9.4%).191
In the terminology used in this Article, comparing the called
opinions of the generally-qualified
group of experts with the lay
92
participants most similar to them:'
(i) False authentication error:
FDEs
12% Lay 12%
(2) False elimination error:
FDEs
8% Lay 24%
This is hardly encouraging news for FDEs, particularly the false
authentication error rate: the generally-qualified group of FDEs were
fooled by the well-executed forgeries used in the Conrad study to the
same extent as were the similar lay participants. The lay false elimination
error rate was, however, three times greater than the FDE rate. (The
small group of six specially screened experts had no errors on either task,
but for all we know the same statistic might be derived if specially
talented lay people had been tested.)
The Conrad study is evidence against FDE expertise, but it is not
clear how much weight should be given to it. Perhaps there are
differences in signature characteristics or FDE characteristics that make
it difficult to generalize from a 1975 German study to other times or
other countries. Moreover, the false authentication error statistics set
forth above were based on a comparison of the decisions of twenty-five
lay persons who examined three forged signatures with the decisions of
twenty-five FDEs who examined three forged signatures. If the number
of subjects or signatures had been greater, differences between lay and
expert performance might have been detected.'93
IV.

PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS

The issues in the legal context are further complicated by the fact
that admission and exclusion of expert opinions are not the only choices.
The expert opinion can be admitted with procedural safeguards that are
designed to protect against prejudice. The trial judge can impose these
conditions in a hearing on a motion in limine in which one of the parties
seeks to exclude the testimony.
In the Hines case, for example, the expert was allowed to testify
about similarities and differences, but not to reach an ultimate
conclusion about authorship.,"' In the context of signature authentication,
accepted called opinions with any degree of certainty.
191. Id.
Id. at 8-9 tbls.2 & 3 (error grade 11 comparison).
193. Each group had a total of nine errors. Outlier performance by one or two members of either
group could have had a material impact on the percentage performance figures.
194. United States. v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70-71 (D. Mass. 1999). I was not a case involving
192.

signature authentication, but rather a case in which the expert would have attributed authorship of a
robbery note used in a bank robbery to the defendant. Id. at 62. Signatures are regarded as special by
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this could translate into allowing the expert to point out similarities and
differences between the questioned signature and the exemplars. The
signs of simulation would be among the differences. For example, if the
questioned signature had blunt endings, extraneous patching, tremor,
and a "drawn" appearance, and the exemplars did not, then the expert
could point out those differences."5
Of course, the jury is almost certain to infer the expert's view from
the exegesis on similarities and differences. This is especially so if the
expert is allowed, for example, to state that blunt endings are a sign of
forgery and to explain why (the alternative here would be to have the
witness point out the blunt endings and have counsel make the
argument). Nonetheless, the similarities and differences approach may
be useful in helping the jury to reason. It prohibits a specific statement of
individualization-that this person signed the document to the exclusion
of all other possible signers, based on the expert's many years of
experience. It lays open the nature of the reasoning process involvedbecause of many similarities, it seems likely that the signature is genuine,
or because of many differences, it seems likely it is not.
One can think of other possible restrictions along the same lines. A
drastic restriction would be to prohibit the expert from making any
statements about a handwriting characteristic being rare or commonthe document examiner community, and at any rate there is likely to be a greater danger of disguise
when composing a note that one knows that police investigators will scrutinize (such as a "stick-up"
note). Assigning authorship to disguised handwriting is a difficult task.
195. These are among the signs of simulation mentioned in the FDE literature. See ORDWAY
HILTON, SCIENTIFIC EXAMINATION OF QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS (rev. ed. 1982); OSBORN, 1929 edition,

supra note 5o;

SCIENTIFIC EXAMINATION OF QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS

94 (Jan Seaman Kelly & Brian S.

Lindbloom eds., 2d ed. 2006). Kelly and Lindbloom, sum up by saying that "[h]esitation, unnatural pen
lifts, patching, tremor, uncertainty of movement as portrayed by abrupt changes in the direction of the
line, and a stilted, drawn quality devoid of free, normal writing movements combine to reveal the
defective nature of a poor-quality simulation." Id. Their more complete catalogue of suspicious signs
also includes: pooling of ink, id. at 82; uniformly heavy stroke, id. at 89; presence of a lightly drawn
outline, id. at 9o; and smearing caused by erasure of an outline, id. at 91. When one of the exemplars
known to be genuine is suspected as being the model for a tracing, then wandering away from the
stroke of the genuine signature and returning to the common track is indicative of tracing, as is
indentation in the genuine signature thought to have been used as a model. Id. at 91-92. Suspicious
signs noted in OSBORN, I9io edition, supra note 28, include: evidence of erasure, id. at 45; pencil
outline or impression on paper under the signature, id. at 77; uneven, slow, wiggly, rough, haltering,
clumsy, hesitating, irregular writing in questioned document when authentic signatures were smooth
and natural, id. at io9-i I; blunt as opposed to tapering terminal strokes, id. at 114-15; deviation from
uniform strokes (tremors), id. at 117; interruptions of movement in direct curves or straight lines, id. at
117; deviation from pen pressure or alignment of genuine exemplars, id. at 123-25, 133; and hesitation,
abnormal changes of direction, inconsistent pen pressure, unnatural movement interruption, pen lifts,
retouching, id. at 267-69. Where a genuine signature may have been used as a model, exact replication
of the genuine signature in the questioned one is a sign of tracing. Id. at 276-77. See also OSBORN.,1929
edition, supra note 50, where signs of forgery include: tremor not attributed to age, weakness, or
illiteracy; id. at io; disconnections or pen-lifts, id. at 114; alignment not consistent with rest of
document, id. at 115; and patching, id. at 129. For an empirical study of the frequency of some of these
features in forged signatures, see infra note 209.
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that is, no statements other than that supported by systematic empirical
research. This seems a rather extreme approach, restricting even
descriptive, summarizational testimony.
Another approach, adopted in the Starzecpyzel case, is to prohibit
the expert from assuming the mantle of science by using scientific
language.' 6 Thus, one might prevent the expert from calling himself a
scientist, from referring to his "laboratory," or from testifying to
misleadingly precise degrees of certainty."
The judge can also attempt to protect against prejudice by
instructing the jury that FDE expertise is not scientific. For example, in
the Starzecpyzel case, the judge prepared instructions that said that
forensic document examination was a practical skill, not a scientific one,
and that "despite anything you may hear or have heard, it does not have
the demonstrable certainty that some sciences have."'' 8 While not
prohibiting the use of all scientific terminology, the court also sought to
guard against its impressiveness by instructing that "although forensic
document examiners may work in 'laboratories,' and may rely on
textbooks with titles like 'The Scientific Examination of Documents,'
forensic document examiners are not scientists-they are more like
artisans, that is, skilled craftsmen.""'
Other safeguards could be directed at making the trial experience
more similar to the studies comparing expert and lay performance. For
example, in the studies the experts are blind to extraneous case
information and they have no reason to expect that a certain result will
aid a party with whom they are aligned.2" The most practical way to
achieve a similar result in casework would be through reforming the
procedures of crime labs.2"' However, it is possible that an inventive
judge could do something in a particular case. For example, in a case
meriting the time and trouble, the judge could require that the
questioned signature and exemplars be submitted to an expert not
previously involved in the case, for example at the FBI crime lab, with a
case file that is devoid of extraneous case information that would affect
the expert's opinion.
Another procedural safeguard would be the admission of "antiexpert" expert testimony about the shortcomings and limits of FDE
expertise. One can hope that efforts to educate judges about the
deficiencies of forensic science will at least lead to a more liberal attitude
196. United States v. Starzecpyzel, 88o F. Supp. 1027, 1029, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
197. Id. at 1048. The Starzecpyzel court prohibited the expert from using a misleadingly precise

nine-point scale to express degrees of certainty.
198. Id. at 1051.

199. Id. at io5o.
200. See studies cited supra notes 126, 144, 18o (Kam, Sita, and Conrad studies).
205. See Risinger et al., supra note 20, at 1O.

HeinOnline -- 59 Hastings L.J. 1139 2007-2008

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:i11oi

toward experts who would point out those flaws to the jury. Familiarity
with the scientific method, not training in the practice of the craft, should
be the criteria by which the qualifications of an "anti-expert" are judged.
Judges should also take care to make sure that the party opposing
the FDE testimony has had adequate discovery. That is another way in
which FDE testimony might affirmatively contribute to justice, as
opposed to leaving the comparison to argument of counsel. If an FDE
makes a determination ahead of time and produces supporting reasons,
then that allows more thoughtful scrutiny and a greater chance for
adversarial testing. Unfair surprise would be more likely if the points
were left to argument of counsel. A predicate of this benefit, however, is
full and complete discovery. If the FDE determines that the signature is
not genuine, for example, the FDE should describe in detail the signs of
simulation and the differences between the exemplars and the
questioned signature.
Another tool would be to give the opposing party the option of
foregoing cross-examination of the expert, and instead require the
proponent to substitute the written report turned over on discovery for
the oral testimony of the expert. This procedure would ensure a
complete written report and would also ameliorate the danger that
extraneous personal characteristics of the expert would have too much
influence on the jury. The party harmed by the report has a right to
confront the witness who wrote it, but this right can be waived. Adoption
of this approach would, however, require judges to rethink the
traditional position about the value of demeanor evidence to the jury.
Finally, there is the question whether case-specific proficiency
testing ought to be allowed. This is a difficult question, for two reasons.
First, it might not provide enough protection for the party opposing the
expert-let us say, the defense in a criminal case. The reason is that the
defense counsel may be reluctant, except in cases of real desperation, to
take the chance. Giving the expert a chance to pass a proficiency test
devised by the defense bears a family resemblance to asking O.J.
Simpson to try on the bloody glove. Secondly, defense-initiated
proficiency testing may just inject confusion and collateral issues. It is
possible to concoct a proficiency test that is unfairly hard, by finding
multiple signatures from different sources that are unusually simple and
similar, or by hiring an experienced forger to make imitations. Moreover,
case-specific proficiency testing would add cost and money, since it
would not be fair to have the expert make decisions on the spot, without
the kind of care that the expert would spend preparing the opinion in the
202. For skeptical assessments of demeanor evidence, see Roger C. Park, EmpiricalEvaluation of
the HearsayRule, in ESSAYS FOR COLIN TAPPER 91 (Peter Mirfield & Roger Smith eds., 2003); ALDERT
VRII, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT (2000); and Olin Guy Wellborn Ill, Demeanor,76 Cornell L. Rev.
1075 (199I).
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case. Most likely there would need to be some kind of judicial
supervision, perhaps even a court-appointed proficiency tester, and this
would add a layer of complexity and supervision that is probably
unrealistic, especially since it would require fairly early judicial
involvement in a case that might, after all, never go to trial.
CONCLUSION

It is time to reach a conclusion about what judges should do with
FDE testimony in signature authentication cases. Before doing so,
however, I should emphasize that my conclusion applies only to that type
of case. I agree with Professor Risinger °3 that, in the spirit of Kumho
Tire, one cannot make a global judgment about the admissibility of FDE
testimony. 4 It depends on the task at hand. The task at hand that I have
discussed is signature authentication." There are other tasks that are
much harder and that have less warrant in the empirical literature. These
include tasks such as assigning authorship to hand printing or assigning
authorship to disguised handwriting. It is one thing to say that a signature
is forged; quite another to say who the forger is. °6
Even within the territory of signature authentication, there are, of
course, different levels of difficulty. The task is made more difficult if
there are few exemplars, or if the signature is a simple one with little
artistry, or if there is a possibility of a skilled forger. But here I think we
must compromise a bit, if only in pity for the poor judge who must make
a task-specific determination. Too much is sacrificed if we try to
subdivide the task further. Endless subdivision would destroy the
precedential value of decisions about the admissibility of forensic science
evidence.
203. Risinger, supra note 5, at 449.
204. Kumho Tire calls for a task-specific judgment. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.
137,1I53-54 (1999).
[T]he specific issue before the court was not the reasonableness in general of a tire expert's
use of a visual and tactile inspection to determine whether overdeflection had caused the
tire's tread to separate from its steel-belted carcass. Rather, it was the reasonableness of
using such an approach, along with Carlson's particular method of analyzing the data
thereby obtained, to draw a conclusion regarding the particular matter to which the expert
testimony was directly relevant. That matter concerned the likelihood that a defect in the
tire at issue caused its tread to separate from its carcass.
Id.
205. Leading FDE authors have identified signature authentication as a special subtask. See
HILTON, supra note 195, at 173 ("[T]he identification of signatures constitutes a specialized branch of
handwriting examination."); JOE NICKELL, DETECTING FORGERY: FORENSIC INvESTIGATION OF
DOCUMENTS 59 (I996); OSBORN, 1929 edition, supra note 5o, at 18-94, 384; see also sources cited supra

note 49.
206. See OSBORN, 1929 edition, supra note 50. In fact, cases in which it is possible that the

questioned signature was written by the person named in the signature, but in a disguised hand (so
that the person could later deny signing the document) also present this different, more difficult taskthat of assigning true authorship to a disguised hand. That is another reason to limit testimony to
similarities and differences and to signs of simulation.
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When deciding whether signature authentication expertise should be
admitted, the alternative should always be in mind. The choice is
between two imperfect processes. Either the jury will compare hands
after the expert has done so, or the jury will do so on its own. Either
process has plenty of opportunity for error.
Visualize the trial in which no expert testimony is admitted, but the
question whether a signature is genuine is crucial. The exemplars and the
questioned signature would be sponsored by lay witnesses who have
personal knowledge. The sponsoring witness might be an investigating
officer, or it might simply be whoever witnessed the questioned signature
and the exemplars. The proponent does not always get to choose its
witnesses.
If the case is important enough, it is probable that the proponent will
have consulted an FDE, even if the FDE's testimony is likely to be
excluded. The FDE will have examined the questioned signature and the
exemplars in her place of work, using magnification where needed. The
FDE will likely have prepared blow-ups with annotations showing signs
of forgery. If the allegation is that the questioned signature is a tracing of
one of the exemplars, then the FDE will have prepared exhibits that
facilitate comparison of the questioned signature and the exemplar
thought to have served as a model, for example by superimposing one
upon the other on a document camera that projects in the courtroom.
If allowed to testify, the FDE might point out differences in
handwriting style-letter formation, slant, adherence to a baseline,
etc.,-between the questioned signature and the exemplars. She would
also probably identify suspicious features of the questioned signature.
The features thought to be suspicious include tremor, pen lifts, blunt
endings, abrupt changes in direction, pooling of ink, minuscule patching,
and a "stilted, drawn quality devoid of free, normal writing
movements."2" Too much similarity to an exemplar is also suspicious, as
indicative of tracing2 8 Examples of trial testimony about traced and
freehand simulations appear in Appendices i and 2. A well-read FDE
might also reference a degree of systematic empirical support for the
hypotheses that touchups, blunt endings, tremor splices, pen lifts, and
superimposability are suspicious features.2"9
2o7. HILTON, supra note 195, at 185.
208. See id.; see also S.C. Leung et al., Forgery ll-Tracing,38 J.FORENSIC SCIs. 413, 423-24 (1993)

(reporting the results of an empirical study, using a writing pressure meter, of signatures traced by 189
subjects). All the signatures traced were "highlighted by the pressure of a slow measured stoke
accompanied with hesitation, pen pause and absence of vigor and spontaneity"; the investigators
measured "superimposability" (overlapping strokes of traced simulations with the model used) and
found that "the probability that a questioned signature has been produced by tracing from another
(genuine) signature is related to the superimposability of the two." Id.
209. See Black et al., supra note 14, and authorities cited therein. Black et al. collected 177 genuine
signatures and 620 simulated signatures, and asked an FDE to count pen lifts, blunt endings, tremor,
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Now, suppose that all expert testimony is excluded. The jury will do
the comparison. If the comparison is important, it would not make sense
to simply introduce the questioned signature and the exemplars, without
comment. Jurors might miss important points, such as minuscule
patching. They might give too much importance to differences that could
be explained (the tremor was caused by illness, not tracing) or rebutted
with additional evidence (genuine handwriting not introduced by the
proponent has a feature different from the proponent's exemplars and
similar to the questioned signature). At any rate, the adversaries are
unlikely to leave comparisons to the jury, nor should they be required to
do so. The specific facts and the inferences to be drawn from them
should be stated in open court, where the parties have a chance to
contest them with arguments and counter evidence.
What about just having the lawyers make the comparisons and argue
about handwriting the same way that they argue about other
circumstantial evidence? In their closing arguments, lawyers could
certainly make many of the points that an FDE would make. They are
legitimate inferences from circumstantial evidence. For example, it
would be reasonable for a lawyer to argue that the genuine signatures
were smooth and flowing, whereas the questioned signature, though it
had the same letter formations, was suspicious because its wavering line
quality was a sign of slow writing, which was a sign of forgery. (In
Osborn's words: "A straight line is not only the shortest distance between
two points but also the quickest distance.")"' But this method could lead
to surprise and an underdeveloped treatment of the subject. It raises
dangers of giving too much importance to similarities and differences
that could be explained or rebutted with other evidence. FDE testimony
might be less dangerous, especially if it were conditioned upon a detailed
expert report and rigorous pretrial discovery.
Another way to try to avoid these dangers would be to have a "show
and tell" lay witness who, during the trial, points out similarities,
differences and suspicious signs. (Sometimes the witness who sponsors
the exhibits will be able to do this, but it would be unfair always to saddle
the party with that witness, who might be inarticulate or uncooperative.)
One possible complication is that, if a lay witness were to make the sort
of minute comparisons described in Appendix 2, the jury might think the
splices, and touch ups. Id. at 2o. These signs of simulation occurred much more frequently in the
simulations than in the genuine signatures. Id. at 21. The comparative percentages of suspicious
features in the genuine to simulated signatures were: 18% to 52% (pen lifts), 17% to 73% (blunt
endings), io% to 62% (tremor), o% to 99% (splices), o% to 19% (touch ups). Id. at 21. The value of
the study is somewhat diminished by the fact that all of the genuine signatures were produced by one
person (the simulations were produced freehand by thirty-one different participants). Id. at i9. On
superimposability of tracings, see Leung et al., supra note 2 o8, at 4 o8-IO.
210. OSBORN, 1929 edition, supra note 5o, at 107. For other references to tremor as a suspicious
sign, see id. at i io; HILTON, supra note 195, at 185; and NICKELL, supra note 205, at 68.
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testimony strange or contrived, and wonder whether something was
being hidden. Who is this person? If he's not an expert, how did he
notice all those details? Aren't there experts in this field? Why don't they
have an expert testify? To prevent this sort of reasoning, it might be
necessary for the court to explain that expert testimony is not being
permitted because the experts have not been proven to be better than
jurors, or at least that expert testimony is not being permitted because
the judge is not satisfied that it would be sufficiently helpful.
There would still be the question of how to handle the avowedly
nonexpert "show and tell" witness. Would the nonexpert be allowed to
reveal that he had consulted with an expert? Allowing this might
frustrate the goal of preventing a jury from relying upon untrustworthy
expertise, and allow the expert's implied opinion to have some effect
even though the expert is not presented for cross-examination. Yet
failing to say this might make the nonexpert look peculiar, if he notes
many things and uses equipment such as microscopes.
Another cost of limiting testimony to lay witness and leaving
inferences to argument of counsel would be that the arguments would
have to be based on introspection and fireside indications. There would
be no sponsor for empirical studies about signs of forgery."'
If an FDE is allowed to testify, to any degree, the question becomes
one of whether the FDE should be allowed to characterize the nature of
the writing in ways that involve expert inferences (e.g., it appears to be
"drawn" and shows signs of "hesitation") and to use expertise in teaching
the jury about signs of genuine or simulated writing (e.g., unexplained
tremor is a sign of slow writing, which is an indicator of tracing). And if
the expert is allowed to make such assertions, then the jury will guess the
expert's conclusion, so it probably does not make much difference
whether the expert is allowed to take the next step of expressing an
opinion about whether the signature is genuine or simulated. (In fact, it is
possible that a gestalt ability to form this sort of opinion, and not the
specific reasons for it, is what differentiates lay from expert performance
on proficiency tests.)
There is a division of authority on how FDE expert testimony should
be treated in signature authentication cases. It remains the general
tendency of courts to issue global opinions allowing FDE testimony,
regardless of the particular task.21' But one case"' admitted FDE
211.

See sources cited supra note

209.

See, e.g., United States v. Paul, i75 F.3d 906, 9io-Ii, (iith Cir. 1999); United States v. Prime,
220 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1205-o6 (W.D. Wash. 2002), affd, 363 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2004). These cases
presented tasks other than the harrowing task of signature authentication scrutinized in this Article;
however, they are examples of global or near-global endorsement and FDE expertise in terms that
would include signature authentication expertise. In his presentation for this symposium, Professor
Risinger noted that during the past four years, trial judges have shown a marked proclivity to admit
212.
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testimony that a signature was not genuine only with limits, and another
case 21 4 excluded it entirely.
I think that FDE testimony on signature authentication should be
admitted, subject to strict procedural limits. The first consideration is the
nature of the experience-based expertise. FDEs are not harbor pilots, but
they are not astrologers either. There is no sure "feedback loop," though
in particular instances document examiners may learn that they are
wrong and suffer a penalty.2"5 Despite the absence of a regular feedback
loop, it seems reasonable to believe that FDEs would learn from
experience-their own experience, the experience of those under whom
they apprenticed, the experience of the authorities in the field. One of
the purposes for which the CTS tests are avowedly created is training, so
they are one feedback loop.16 The takers of the tests get specific
feedback on the correctness of their answers, and the purchasers of the
test materials can keep them and use them in teaching future
apprentices. Second, the fact that FDEs are exposed to extraneous case
information has a double effect. It diminishes the independent value of
their expert judgment in a particular case, because their decision that a
signature is genuine or not is likely influenced by information that has
nothing to do with the signature. But in the long run the extraneous
information gives them a basis for knowing what forgeries look like. Just
the fact that they compare exemplars of unquestioned authenticity with
questioned documents would be some basis for drawing inferences, since
at least some of the questioned documents are sure to be simulations, so
the fact that features appear with greater frequency in questioned
documents than in the unquestioned standards is some evidence that
those features are signs of simulation. When we add to that the
extraneous information-for example, the document examiner knows
FDE testimony after string citing appellate court decisions that upheld admission of the testimony as
within trial court discretion (and treating those appellate opinions as if they were ones that mandated
the admission of FDE testimony). He concluded that the battle to exclude FDE testimony had been
lost. Michael Risinger, Professor, Presentation at Hastings Law Journal Symposium: "Faces of
Forensics: Identification and Behavior" (Mar. 21, 2008).
213. United States v. Starzecpyzel, 88o F. Supp. 1027, 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
214. United States v. Brewer, No. oiCR892, 2002 WL 596365, at *6-8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. I6, 2002).
The document examiner would have testified that a signature was a traced forgery, the model for
which was one of the exemplars that had been located. Id. at *6-7. The court held that the expert
testimony was inadmissible. Id. at *8 (citing United States v. Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d IO77 (D. Alaska
2000); United States v. Fujii, 152 F. Supp. 2d 939 (D. I11.2000); United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d.
6z, 67-68 (D. Mass. 1999)).
215. Examples of exposure include the Dreyfus trial, see D.H. Kaye, Revisiting Dreyfus: A More
Complete Account of Trial by Mathematics, 91 MINN. L. REV. 825 (2007), and the Clifford
Irving/Howard Hughes hoax, see NICKELL, supra note 205. Identification of the signature on the Bush
National Guard records also raised dangers of being proven wrong. See Howard Kurtz, Rather
Defends CBS over Memos on Bush, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2004, at Ao7.
26. See, e.g., CTS TEST No. 01-524, supra note 99, at I (containing standard statement that test
samples may, in the option of the receiving labs, be used in a "training exercise").
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that the other evidence indicates conclusively that the document is a
forgery-then we can see how the examiner, and his predecessors and
tutors, might develop a degree of justified confidence about what is
suspicious and what is not. In other words, they have the opportunity to
compare signatures known to be genuine with each other, and sometimes
with signatures almost certain to be forgeries."'
In FDE expertise, we have a field that comes from an empirical
tradition broadly defined, not a magical or superstitious one, like
astrology. Its suppositions about the signs of forgery are plausible and
logically consistent. It is one that has been endorsed by authorities that
we ordinarily respect." ' It is expertise that has not been discredited by
the scientific method." 9 Its suppositions about signs of forgery are
supported to some extent by systematic empirical research." ' And finally,
there are studies comparing lay and expert performance that indicate
superior performance by experts under test conditions.'
We might wish for more. It would be nice, for example, to have
studies comparing how mock juries do at the signature authentication
task under the tutelage of an expert, compared to how they do on their
own. Another condition could pit an anti-expert against an FDE expert,
testing Professor Berger's hypothesis that this procedure might provide
better protection for defendants than leaving the signature comparisons
to untutored jurors who are not aware of the dangers of error.2
Nonetheless, we do now have respectable studies that show superior
expert performance. Those same studies can be used to show jurors
something about expert error. The jury is certainly entitled to know, not
only that experts have performed better than lay persons in avoiding the
error of saying that a genuine signature is simulated, but also that even
the experts have a significant error rate.
What about the loss of research if the evidence becomes admissible?
It is quite possible that exclusion of FDE testimony would encourage
more research. But it would be naive to assume that judges could force
all forms of forensic science to rise to the level of DNA evidence, and it
is not clear whether it would be wise to aspire to that level. Exclusion of
217. See sources cited supra notes 213-14.
218. For example, Dean Wigmore wrote the introduction to Osborn's first edition. See OSBORN,
i9IO edition, supra note 28, at vii-ix. Also, many courts have endorsed the expertise. See also sources
cited supra note 212.
219. See generally Black et al., supra note 14.
220. See id.
221. See supra Part III.
222. See Berger, supra note 123, at 1138.
Is the defendant better protected when jurors during deliberation compare the uncrossed t's
or undotted i's in the crime scene samples and the provided specimens, as they have
probably seen done on some TV show, than if the court allows a prosecution expert to
testify who is then demolished by Professor Saks?
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evidence is a blunt tool with which to try to influence the allocation of
resources toward research on forensic science. It cannot assess the value
of competing claims to resources. A Daubert hearing is not the best
forum to assess competing claims of forensic and medical research, or
even the competing claims of different types of forensic research.
Moreover, the amount of research needed would be enormous. The
testing of basic factual assumptions requires an extensive research
program, as is suggested by a careful listing of the basic premises of the
field by two legal experts who support testing of those premises.223 And
the list is not complete. In the area of signature authentication, one can
think of many other candidates for research-for example, whether
simulations are marked by detectable tremor, blunt endings, patching,
ink pooling, unnatural line width, etc. It would take an ambitious
program to test each of these assumptions. Of course, more could be
done on testing proficiency in the area that has been the particular focus
of this Article-signature authentication-but even there, one must
make resource allocation decisions. It may be more reasonable to move
on to comparing how experts and lay subjects do in performing other
handwriting identification tasks.
Finally, it is not completely clear that admitting identification
evidence will always have the effect of dampening incentives for
systematic research. In the eyewitness identification area, research has
flourished despite the fact that eyewitness identification testimony is
generally admitted. 24 One can think of plausible arguments for stricter
exclusion of eyewitness identification testimony (for example, when the
identification is not corroborated by other evidence, or when it is the
result of a nonblind simultaneous lineup, or when the fillers do not
sufficiently resemble the victim's description of the perpetrator). Stricter
exclusion might be worthwhile on its own merits, but it is unclear what
the effect of that approach would have on research. It is possible that
admission of the evidence has stimulated research. The same thing may
be said about confessions, where the research has generally come from
doubters of the value of the evidence, not from proponents of confession
evidence. 25
Of course, there are many differences between eyewitness
identification research and handwriting identification research, one of
them being that issues of eyewitness identification overlap with academic
psychologists' interests in the study of perception and memory by
Risinger & Saks, supra note 47, at 67-74.
See Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the
Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 96o-64 (2006).
225. See, e.g., RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE (2008); Richard A.
Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back in: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First
Century, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 479.
223.

224.
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psychologists. But the fact that experts who doubt the value of the
identification are allowed to testify has probably also stimulated
research. If, as advocated in this Article, expert doubters are allowed to
testify in response to FDE experts, that might also stimulate research by
the doubters. We can also hope that the amount of academic interest will
increase, for example by scholars interested in statistics and signal
detection theory.226

My conclusion-admittedly a debatable one-is that the FDE
experts should be allowed to testify in signature authentication cases. But
that does not mean that they should have the unfettered freedom that
they have sometimes been given in the past. Judge McKenna was correct,
in the Starzecpyzel case, to take measures that would prevent FDEs from
being confused with research scientists.227 Procedural safeguards should
include instructions that the expertise is not scientific, restrictions on the
use of scientific jargon or science-invoking words such as "laboratory,"
and full discovery of detailed conclusions. Judges should consider
enforcing discovery and reducing the role of personality by allowing the
opponent to opt for admission of the written report in lieu of live
testimony. When FDEs testify, witnesses with knowledge of the scientific
method should be allowed to testify on the other side, questioning
scientific status, proficiency, or the validity of conclusions. Moreover, in
cases in which the stakes are high and the authentication question is
crucial, the opponent of the expertise should be able to demand blind
retesting by a neutral FDE.

226. David Faigman, Professor, Presentation at Hastings Law Journal Symposium: "Faces of
Forensics: Identification and Behavior" (Mar. 21, 2008); see also David L Faigman, Anecdotal
Forensics,Phrenology,and Other Abject Lessons from the History of Science, 59 HASTINGS L. J. 979
(2008).

227. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX

Q.

I: EXAMPLE

1149

TESTIMONY ABOUT A TRACED SIMULATIONZ

8

You have stated that, in your opinion, the signature of the

decedent on the purported will dated

is not genuine.

Would it be helpful to use your exhibits in explaining how you arrived at
your conclusion?
A. Yes, it would. While the signature in question, shown at the top
of the chart, appears to be pictorially similar to the standard writings that
are shown here [witness indicates], the writing in question takes on a
dead, flat appearance when compared to the genuine counterparts.
There is a significant difference in the line quality between the standard
and questioned writings. There are many areas exhibiting tremor. Note
the tremulous or shaky movement indicated by the arrows at the t -bar
crossing in the first letter, and in the capital letters 0 and C. The writer
of the standards moves his hand swiftly; the questioned signature is
slowly written. The standard writings show tapered or feathered endings,
whereas the questioned signature has blunt ending strokes. In addition,
the variation of pen pressure differs significantly between the standard
writings and the questioned signature. The document in question lacks
the pen pressure variation seen in the genuine writings. This commonly
occurs as a result of the copying process necessary in tracings or
simulated writings.
0. How is a tracing recognized?
A. Tracings may be recognized in several ways. If pre-existing
writing has been erased, one would find pencil lead embedded in the
paper fibers. If a carbon outline of the model writing was used, carbon
traces are usually left on the document.
0. Any other ways?
A. Yes. A tracing may also have the model signature indented
onto the page by a stylus or other blunt instrument. Of course, the forger
may simply use back light of some sort to copy a signature, such as by
holding the paper up to a window and tracing the genuine writing. In
such a case, the telltale indications of the tracing are not as prominent.
Q. Did you find any carbon tracings on the purported will?
A. No.
Q. Did you find any pencil markings or erasures?
A. No.
Q. Did you find any stylus markings or indentations?
A. No.
228. This appendix has been excerpted, with permission, from American Jurisprudence Proof of
Facts 3 d. 27 AM. JUR. 3D Proofof Facts § Io8.
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Q. How, then, do you know that the questioned signature is a
tracing?
A. At first, I was unsure whether I had a tracing or a simulation,
because there were no traces of pencil lead, carbon, or indentations.
However, when the cognovit note was brought to my laboratory on
[date], I knew the signature on the will was a tracing.
Q. Again, how do you know?
A. I had before me two signatures that were, for all practical
purposes, the same. One of the basic rules of handwriting is that no
person repeats handwriting with exact precision. Therefore, two writings
that are exactly the same cannot both be genuine.
Q. If they are both the same, how can you tell which is the genuine
writing and which is the tracing?
A. In this case, the signature on the cognovit note is written with
greater speed, as evidenced in the initial "tick" strokes right here
[witness indicates] and in the feathered ending strokes. The signature in
question, however, has all the earmarks of nongenuineness, including
slow, drawn movement, blunt ending strokes, and hesitations in the
writing. My other chart, Plaintiff's Exhibit
, shows this.
Q. Please continue.
A. I have photographed the signatures on both the cognovit note
and the will with a transparent grid overlay. One can see the sameness of
the beginning and ending positions of the signatures, and how the
signatures follow the same grid alignment. Again, though, please note
the differences in writing quality between these writings.
Q. Were you able to identify who traced the signature?
A. No. In cases of this kind, it is not possible to identify the writer
of the tracing. The tracing is nothing more than a slow drawing of the
model signature, and therefore lacks identifiable handwriting features.
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APPENDIX 2: EXAMPLE TESTIMONY ABOUT FREEHAND SIMULATION

29

Q. I'm going to ask you to explain how you arrived at your
conclusion about the nongenuineness of the signature on the will. Would
it be helpful for you to use your exhibits in explaining your findings to
the jury?
A. Yes, very much so.
Q. Then I ask, with the court's permission, that you step down and,
using the exhibits, explain how you arrived at your opinion.
A. Certainly. Now, the chart marked Plaintiff's Exhibit
shows signatures from both the questioned writing and the

standards. Perhaps the first thing one notices in these signatures is the
similarity between the standard and questioned writings. Pictorially, the
standard and questioned writings look alike in letter design and shape.
However, close examination shows significant differences between the
bodies of writing.
0. What differences are those?
A. There is a difference in the rhythm of writing as between the
standards and the questioned signature. There is also a significant
difference in the size of the writings. The questioned signature is smaller
than the standard writings, even though there was approximately the
same amount of writing space available. In addition, the standards are
written with greater speed than the questioned signature. Slower writing
is often found in a nongenuine signature, because the writer, being
unfamiliar with how the letters are formed, must take greater care in the
writing process and cannot execute the writing freely.
Q. Any other differences?
A. Yes. The letter heights and ratios found in the bodies of writing
are significantly different. The standard writings are narrow, oval, and
more angular in form than the questioned signature forms, which are
more compressed. I might also point out that the author of the standard
writings places the first and last names close together, while the writer of
the questioned signature allows for more space between the names. In
addition, there is a significant difference in the forms of letters and letter
connections as between the standard and questioned writings.
Q. Please explain.
A. The letter 1 in the standards is written with a vertical or
rightward slant, while the 1 in the questioned signature angles to the left.
The letter i in the questioned writing differs in that it is extremely short
229. This appendix has been excerpted, with permission, from American Jurisprudence Proof of
Facts3 d. 27 AM. JUR. 3D Proofof Facts § IIO.
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when compared to the i in the standard writings. The i -dot in the
questioned writing is made with a rightward dash, unlike the i -dot in the
standard writings. The letter e in the standards is narrow and vertical,
while in the disputed signature the e is short and squatty. The capital
letter T in the last name is typically crossed with a long, sweeping stroke
in the standard writings, but is crossed with a much shorter stroke in the
questioned document. This is different from any of the standards I
examined. The letter h differs also. In the standard writings, the letter is
constructed with a slightly hooked downstroke, followed by a second
stroke of the letter, forming a definite v-shaped wedge coming from the
base of the h. In the questioned writing, the letter h has quite a different
appearance.
Q. Are there any other differences in letter form?
A. There are several other such differences, yes. There is a
difference between the standard and questioned writings in the rhythm
and design of the letter m, for example. Again, we see compression in the
questioned writing that is not found in the standards. Although the letter
p begins in a similar fashion in both the standard and the questioned
writings, they are different. This is best seen at the point where the two
portions of the lower loop of the p intersect. In the standards, the pen
moves diagonally, but in the questioned signature, this portion of the
letter moves horizontally. The questioned p is definitely flatter and
proportionally shorter than in the standard writings. Moreover, the
letters s are indicative of two different writers. The letters in the
standards display only a hint of a hook at the beginning of the s, whereas
the questioned signature shows a wider stroke. The ending formation of
the letter s is not the same. In the standards, the bottom of the letter is
very angular on the left side, while the questioned s is rounded.
Q. Please continue.
A. The second o is also formed differently as between the standard
and questioned writings. Again, you can see the oval form of the
standards, in contrast to the rounded form found in the questioned
signature. In the standards, the letter n is nondescript and, in fact,
illegible. The questioned n is more defined-not a significant difference
in itself, as a person can write with greater definition from one moment
to the next, but nevertheless a difference in the flow of the final stroke.
The standards writer consistently ends with a blunt stroke, unlike the
writer of the questioned signature, which ends with a sweeping flourish.
Q. You also mentioned some differences you observed in letter
connections?
A. Yes. In the standards, the h is continued with a downstroke of
the pen, and at this point, the writer moves on to form the letter o. In the
questioned writing, the h begins in a similar fashion, but that is where the
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similarity ends. Unlike the writer of the standards, the writer of the
questioned signature retraces part of the stem and then moves the pen to
the right in a sweeping horizontal direction. There is a pen-lift between
the h and the o that is not found in any of the standard writings. Also,
there is a fundamental difference between the standard and questioned
writings in the construction of the first o in the last name. In the standard
writings, the letter o initiates from the last stroke of the preceding h. The
pen then moves upward, flowing in a counterclockwise motion. Note how
the o is flat on the left side but curved on the right side. The writer of the
standards regularly ends the letter on the left side and connects the "om"
combination, where the m begins from the top left side of the preceding
0.

Q. And that differs from what you observed in the questioned
writing?
A. Yes. The first letter o in the questioned signature begins at the
top of the letter, moves in a counterclockwise direction, and ends on the
right side of the letter, connecting with the letter m from the right side.
That is another indication of two writers rather than just one.
0. So your opinion, once again, is what?
A. After closely comparing the known signatures of the decedent
with the questioned signature, one can see that, although the writings
bear some similarities, the disputed signature is clearly a simulation of
the true writing, and not a genuine signature.
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3: 1988 CTS TEST RESULTS23

1988 CTS TEST: TASKS TESTED
In the text, I extracted the signature authentication tasks from the
1988 CTS test. It also tested other tasks, which will be described here.
After that description, the reader will find a detailed tabulation of the
signature authentication tasks.
In the test scenario, the six signed receipts were the questioned
documents, designated as Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5, and Q6. The request
exemplars of known signatures were designated Ki, K2, K3, K4, and K5.
The givers of the exemplars signed their own names and all of the other
names in the questioned documents repeatedly.
The receipt Q1 was signed with the name. "Sharon D. Clayborne." It
was actually signed by Richard D. Osbourn, the "driver" whose
exemplars were designated K5, not by the real Sharon D. Clayborne,
whose exemplars were designated Ki.
The receipt Q2 was signed with the name "Lisa D. Bridgeforth." t
was actually signed by Lisa D. Bridgeforth, whose exemplars were
designated K2.
The receipt Q3 was signed with the name "Cynthia Y. Boone." It
was actually signed by Richard D. Osbourn, the "driver" whose
exemplars were designated K5, not by the real Cynthia Y. Boone, whose
exemplars were designated K3.
The receipt Q4 was signed with the name "Joanna Neuman." It was
actually signed by the real Joanna Neuman, whose exemplars were
designated K4.
The receipt Q5 was signed with the name "Linda M. Ninestine."
There were no exemplars from the real Linda M. Ninestine. The
signature on receipt Q5 was not signed by any of the subjects from whom
exemplars had been obtained.
The receipt Q6 was signed with the name "Linda D. Wentworth." It
was actually signed by Richard D. Osbourn, the "driver" from whom the
exemplars designed K5 had been obtained. There were no exemplars
from the real Linda D. Wentworth.
The test takers were asked to compare each of the questioned
signatures (Qi through 06) with each of the known handwriting samples
(Ki through K5) and to identify or exclude the writer of the exemplar as
the writer of the questioned signature. In identifying or excluding, the
test takers were given the choice of a firm conclusion (the questioned
signature "was" or "was not" written by the author of one of the sets of
exemplars) or a qualified one (the questioned signature "was probably"
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or "was probably not" written by the author of one of the sets of
exemplars). Test takers were also given the choice of "no conclusion" or
"other (specify)."
A completely correct answer on the test would have been:
i. Richard Osbourn was the author of QI, Q3, and Q6.
2. Lisa Bridgeforth was the author of Q2.
3. Joanna Neuman was the author of Q4.
4. None of the exemplar givers was the author of Q5.

PART 2. TABULATION OF SIGNATURE AUTHENTICATION RESPONSES ON

CTS

1988

PROFICIENCY TEST23'

Receipt QI:
* Correct answer: The questioned document is not the
authentic signature of Sharon D. Clayborne.
* Results: ioo% correct (48/48) (all respondents gave
affirmatively correct answers)
Receipt Q2:
* Correct answer: The questioned document is the authentic
signature of Lisa D. Bridgeforth.
Results:

*
*

All opinions: 87.5% correct (42/48) (42 correct, i wrong, 2
inconclusive, 3 "other")
Called opinions: 97.6% correct (42/43) (discarding
inconclusive/other responses)

The "other" comments were:
"definite similarities"
"inconclusive with investigative leads for collection of
additional evidence (standard writing) or notation ... [that]
case may not be resolved via F.D.E. Examination."
* "Significant similarities noted"
231. In tabulating the answers, I have excluded the answers of lab 517, which lodged a blanket
protest against every question on the test, writing that "Due to the quality of the photographs and the
type of known handwriting specimens submitted, a definite conclusion could not be reached...." I
think it is more appropriate to treat this statement as a nonresponse than as an "inconclusive." CTS
REPORT No. 88-5, supra note 55, at 24.
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Thus, two of the "other" comments lean toward the correct answer,
and one calls for additional exemplars.
Receipt 03:
* Correct answer: The questioned document is not the
authentic signature of Cynthia Y. Boone.
* Results: 97.9% correct (47/48) (all respondents gave
affirmatively correct or wrong answers)
Receipt Q4:
* Correct answer: The questioned document is the authentic
signature of Joanna Neuman. (The authentic Neuman
signature posed the biggest problems for the FDEs. Some of
the written comments suggest that the reason might be that
Neuman's exemplars had a good deal of intrawriter variation
and that her signature did not have many distinguishing
features. It is also possible that Neuman made some attempt
to vary or disguise her hand when she signed the "receipt,"
though the released test description gives no reason for
thinking that this occurred.)
Results:
* All opinions: 52.1% correct (25/48) (25 correct, 3 wrong, II
inconclusive, 9 other)
* Called opinions: 89.2% correct (25/28) (discarding
inconclusive/other responses)
The "other" comments were:
* "possibly the writer of"
* "no association"
* "some indications, want more known"
* "some similarity and could be"
* "there were enough similarities noted to warrant the
examination of additional known standards"
* "should not be eliminated"
* "add'l exemplar and analysis required"
* "cannot be identified or eliminated"
* "definite similarities"
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Classifying these comments, seven show at least a suspicion that
Neuman was the writer (a correct answer), one found "no association"
with any of the exemplars from any of the subjects (a wrong answer), and
one simply called for additional exemplars and analysis.
Overall tabulation of called opinions:
* False authentication error:
* False elimination error:

I%

(1/96)

6%

(4/71)
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